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18 April 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

LEFT SOCIALISTS LEADERSHIP DIVIDED ON SECURITY POLICY

Chairman Interviewed on Resignation

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 21 Feb 86 p 4

[Article by Stig Albinus and Erik Meier Carlsen]

[Text] Preben Wilhjelm has now been overtaken by his party's reformist "red realists." He is also disappointed because the party has so little understanding of what the term "democracy" means. Last fall, after 17 years in the service of his party, he resigned from the Executive Committee to devote himself to problems involving the justice system.

Recently Preben Wilhjelm, who for almost 1 decade has personified VS (Left Socialist Party) in the eyes of the general public, took up other pursuits.

Last year he struck a significant blow for a project he had been involved in for many years--getting the party to accept an understanding of democracy that would expand on the freedoms and rights advocated by the nonsocialists and would limit them under no circumstances--as has been the rule under socialist regimes.

The effort was a success. Wilhjelm, who has been widely praised as a member of parliament, "fell victim" to the party's rotation rule in 1984. This rule prevents VS members from holding a paid, full-time position of trust for more than 8 years.

He himself was extremely active in having this rule adopted.

After the victory at the last congress, Wilhjelm allowed himself to be voted into the Executive Committee. Just a few months later, however, he resigned.

"At the last congress we finally confirmed the obligatory support of democracy, which some of us had fought for, as part of our understanding of socialism," he said.

"Others in the party and I thought this was such a powerful demonstration that we wanted to point it out to the rest of the world--since, otherwise, the party was and still is in a difficult situation."

"This is why I accepted being elected to the Executive Committee. I resigned last fall for personal reasons. I did not have the time. During that period, as I said, I had been able to attend only about half the Executive Committee meetings, since I had plenty to do with seminars and meetings throughout the country that were related to problems with the justice system. I find these problems no less important and, in many respects, they are more satisfying to work with."

"After 25 years you become tired and impatient when you must sit through the same discussions again and again."

Disappointed

After the approval of the democracy resolution, were you disappointed because the party did not follow a more positive line?

"Yes, I would say so, but that is not why I resigned. After all, during the 17 years in which VS has existed, I have become accustomed to being disappointed."

"But you are right. Considering that we had completed this rather extensive debate, it was disappointing that many members of the Executive Committee had failed to understand or to assimilate that which had been approved."

How was that made manifest?

"Both on the question of the Afghanistan demonstration and with regard to internal party democracy. In the past, our employees have been subject to the controversial "political tests," where after each new congress our secretaries were 'evaluated.' Once again, we seemed to be falling into this same old groove."

Democracy And Workers' Majority

How much does the question of democracy have to do with general political considerations, for example the discussion of a workers' majority, which will be brought up for discussion this weekend?

"It has very little to do with that. Obviously, the concept of democracy is one of the most important political questions that can be discussed. The debate uncovered fundamental disagreements within the party. In principle, however, the discussion of a 'workers' majority' and 'reform politics,' as we called the debate previously, can go off in different directions."

Moving Very Rapidly

You have not been disappointed in this area?

"No, no, no. I believe things have moved quite rapidly in that area. The reform discussion is very old and has existed at least since VS gained representation in parliament in 1975."

"If you consider the difficulties we had maintaining a certain positive line during those years, then I believe we have moved quite rapidly."

"Think about our first efforts in the discussion of unemployment. Our jobs plan suffered an extremely miserable fate within the party, since it attempted to take the balance of payments problem seriously."

"Many members who later called themselves 'reform politicians' and 'red realists' and whatever else they might call themselves were, nevertheless, against the jobs and balance of payments plan at that time."

"Then they continued with their pragmatic positions on economic policy, economic democracy, and now security policy."

"So, I do not believe that we should be too disappointed because things have not come out better."

Do you believe that, in the rush, any of the prerequisites for your reform work have been lost? As I remember your position, one of your decisive points was to reject compromise as a matter of principle since, as you said, "VS supports anything that means progress--however small--for the working class, but rejects anything that would mean a step backward--however small."

"Yes, but that does not mean that we reject compromise. Whenever we have been included in the discussion at all, we have been open to negotiated solutions that we believe are inferior to our own proposals."

"But there is a difference between accepting compromises and accepting something that would mean a step backward."

"We have opposed comprehensive agreements in which we would be forced to swallow something that would worsen the situation directly and that would go against the policies of our party."

"It is correct that for many years it has been not only my position, but also that of the party, to reject such package solutions. It was not so much a matter of 'clean hands'."

"As things are done at Christiansborg, however, the very mode of operation is a direct hinder to party democracy. The troubling aspect of this is that the other parties accept it."

"They negotiate under the pressure of deadlines and under conditions that make it impossible for them to inform even their own inner circle. When compromises are being negotiated at Christiansborg, it makes you stop and think when you see members of the parliamentary groups of the negotiating parties turn to the TV news to see what their negotiators are saying."

"This has occurred many times. The formation of an SV government was a great surprise to many."

"We do not believe that this is the role a party should offer its members. Consequently, according to our structure, it is the Executive Committee, not the parliamentary group, that takes a position on all major issues. The committee members are not professional politicians and they have other contacts. This is also important."

"As we have said, the manner in which work is done at Christiansborg prevents us from participating."

"On the other hand, we have demonstrated clearly that no one needs to feel stabbed in the back. We say in advance how we will vote. We do not come out with sudden surprises."

"It is clear, however, that the workers' majority discussion changes the position we have held somewhat."

"But this is not as fundamental a change as some think. As an example, as early as 1975 we made a clear exception to our principle. In a concrete, individual situation, we cannot simply dismiss a government such as a Social Democratic or Socialist People's Party government, which we might prefer, by simply saying, 'Just do as we say and your government need not fall'."

"We cannot take that position in good conscience, when it comes to the final approval for the budget. That is a question for the cabinet, due to constitutional considerations. When I realized that in 1975, as political chairman, I went straight to the Executive Committee, which approved a measure, according to which we could vote for certain setbacks by voting for the final budget proposal. Of course, we would still emphasize our own positions during votes on individual points in the budget."

"Basically, this is the discussion that has now been expanded and now comprises the discussion on a workers' majority."

After Schluter

But the situation you are describing is still a totally transparent situation. Reality demands something other than transparency, does it not?

"I do not mean to say that nothing has happened since 1975."

"Very much has happened in our discussions. Of course, the new plan for a workers' majority will be carried out at the expense of transparency."

"And this will probably lead to the next step, namely no longer refusing to give up anything, even if such a loss is contained in a package that, on the whole, seems defensible."

"This new approach arose politically and psychologically through our experience with the nonsocialist government."

"I admit that, from 1975 to 1982, VS was hardly prepared to discuss a break with these principles, which applied to every area except the budget. Until

we experienced the nonsocialist government and the catastrophic emergency policies of the past 3 or 4 years, we were not even prepared to take up the topic for discussion, which we have now done."

Is that an admission that refusing to use a shifting majority has strengthened the nonsocialist parties?

"Yes, in part, but it is also an admission that you will hardly see a Social Democratic government seriously trying to use a shifting majority. But a Social Democratic government will have more or less of a preference--experience tells us it has more of a preference--to blame everything on the left wing and allow itself to be ousted or, at least, 'hindered in its work' by the left wing."

"This admission is a rather strong reorientation--more for certain sectors of VS than for me personally. Some of them have made a quick about-face."

"I believe that, in the past, there has been a childish contempt for anything resembling a workers' majority and for the advantages of a Social Democratic minority government."

"VS has had some stupid discussions concerning whether or not a Social Democratic government was preferable to a nonsocialist government."

"Here, our experience with the Schluter government has shaken some people."

"The main problem with acceptance in principle of compromises that result in setbacks is our need to take party democracy into account. We do not act under pressure. The whole idea of all-night negotiations and journalists poking microphones into the faces of the negotiators is totally destructive to a system of party democracy such as ours. If we were to begin operating in this way, we would have to do everything possible to avoid shocking our party members and voters. We would have to anticipate all possible situations that could arise."

"This is what Birkholm is now doing with security policy."

Disagree With Style

"I disagree strongly with him on much of its content, especially when he presents it as an ideal plan, rather than something we may be forced to accept."

"I would prefer to see him present it as something we may be forced to live with, since we do not have a majority in favor of our position or that of the peace movement. It is just something we can support realistically, in cooperation with the Social Democrats. But it is certainly nothing that we really want. Any thought of a military defense of this part of the world is total lunacy."

"I am also annoyed by his style. I always tried to prepared the party for a shock, when I was in a position to do so. This is an extremely poor method of operation. It is totally foreign to VS."

"Just think of all the time we have spent and the chances to take the offensive that we have lost because we have placed such great emphasis on discussing everything in advance."

"We have certainly lost many opportunities in the areas of jobs, housing, and others."

"Klavs' style is extremely annoying and unfortunate, but the party's style in approaching such foreseeable problems in the past has been so reluctant, uncommitted, and slow that Klavs' methods may be partly forgiven. At least what he does forces the party to discuss the issues. It should not be necessary to force the party to act in this way. I have not done so, but my approach has caused us to lose ground and has made us lose opportunities to take the offensive."

"The balance-of-payments and jobs plans were presented for the party to discuss, but it took 5, 6, or even 7 years before we began, somewhat half-heartedly with the 'red experts' report, to take these matters seriously."

"In the meantime, others appeared on the scene. When we first began, it was before the employment plans of the Social Democrats, before there was an alternative energy plan, and before the labor unions began working on these issues. But the party's reluctance to act and the demand for discussions within the party held us back."

Disagree With Holmsgaard On Economic Democracy

Do you agree with Anne Grete Holmsgaard and her position on obligatory profit sharing, which she presented for the first time just before the latest VS Party Congress?

"No, I do not agree with Anne Grete and her views on economic democracy. After all we have seen with regard to how money should be used, we have no reason to believe that it will be an instrument for restructuring society. I have read carefully what chief LO (Federation of Trade Unions) economist Poul Nyrup Rasmussen said--and this is some of the most articulate material that the Social Democrats have produced--on the use of wage-earner funds. It is hard for me to see that they would be much different than the minor examples we have already seen with the ATP (General Supplementary Pension System) fund and others, which have not been used for any promising or alternative projects, at all--and even if we had the courage to invest in some extremely risky alternative project, we would still have to ask ourselves why on earth reasonable investments in the environment, etc., must be made through forced savings that are financed solely by wage earners and not by the taxpayers in general. So, I believe there are still too many unanswered questions. If we look at our general experience with how the capital market works, the answers will not be very pleasant."

They Streaked By

Is that an example of how some things have been moving faster within VS?

"It was rather sudden. We had little forewarning about it. It is also an example of presenting new ideas and opinions in a manner that I do not support. I have never used that style. Instead, I have always made sure that the party participated. I must admit to Anne Grete, however, that she achieved a faster and more serious discussion of the economic democracy question than she ever could have by using my style. I believe that the party is at fault here. It would have been ideal to use my approach, but it would have been unbelievably slow."

Your conclusion is, then, that the "red realists" have gone too far to the right?

"No, I would not say that. A lot depends on how their proposals are seen. If we see them, as I would prefer, as extremely important topics that must be discussed, with fewer preconditions than in previous VS debates, in the light of the possibility of a workers' majority, for example, then I agree that it is important to discuss them. It is extremely important for us to foresee situations, so that they can be discussed out in the hinterlands before we suddenly take a position on them at Christiansborg and suddenly surprise the entire party. In this sense, it is commendable that they have brought all these important questions into the debate, so that the party can discuss them. If they believe, however, that all their proposals--including the economic democracy proposal and Klavs' security policy proposal--are something that we can support whole-heartedly, instead of something that we could justifiably support because we want a workers' majority to function, then I would have to disagree with them on these two points."

Then there is a difference between discussing what VS may have to support under a workers' majority and discussing what VS itself would like to achieve under a workers' majority? There also seems to be a difference of opinion as to whether a workers' majority is a strategic point in itself or an unpleasant tactical reality with which VS must deal?

"Yes, that is true."

Prefers VS Outside Majority

You stated previously that you hope VS will not be part of a workers' majority. It is more important to be a critical force in parliament than to participate actively in its policies. Is this true?

"I still believe that is true. The ideal situation not only for VS, but also for SF (Socialist People's Party), would be for the workers' majority in parliament to be so great that the Social Democrats and SF alone would hold a majority. That would be better not only for VS. I believe I also said before that VS would fall apart at that time. That was 2 years ago. I am convinced

that VS would have fallen apart if the party had been part of a workers' majority in parliament. The situation has changed dramatically and it is because of Anne Grete, Klavs, and the 'red realists' who, through their provocative proposals, have helped prepare the party for this situation. In this sense, it is somewhat easier today, although it is still difficult."

"I still maintain, however, that it would be a more ideal situation if the workers' parties had so many seats in parliament that the Social Democrats and SF alone held a majority. I believe that few SF members would disagree with me when I say that the existence of VS has been of great importance in keeping SF in its present position and making them reevaluate their experience with previous workers' majorities. As we know, SF has just been through a good reevaluation process. I believe that SF handled the situation quite well when it was part of the parliamentary majority that, together with the Radical Liberal Party, was to form the foundation of a government during the final term before Anker resigned. In this situation, the Social Democrats took every opportunity to blame SF for everything, while the Radicals were permitted to make all kinds of promises and then go hide, without ever being blamed by the Social Democrats for the downfall of the government."

"I still believe, however, that it would be far more advantageous for the left wing as a whole if five or six seats in parliament were occupied by someone--whether it be VS members or others--who could be more critical of the workers' majority."

No Illusions About Social Democrats

How is it possible to mobilize support for such a critical position? It is as if you do not want to have influence. VS is supposed to act as a catalyst for SF. Is the idea that the Social Democrats will act, while certain critical parties stand along the sidelines?

"No, I do not believe that is true. I have no illusions about what the Social Democrats would do in such a situation. I believe that much of the discussion about a workers' majority is far too optimistic with regard to what the Social Democrats may be expected to do. This does not correspond to our previous experience. On the other hand, we must admit that there has hardly been another time in the post-war period--apart, perhaps, from 1945-1947--in which the Social Democrats have been on the march as strongly as they are now. But we have seen in the past that the tactical positions they have taken during a period in opposition have been totally forgotten once they regained power. There are some indications that the changes may be more permanent this time. As an example, their new course in security policy seems to represent a genuine change, but experience tells us that we should not expect the Social Democrats to utilize a workers' majority for any particular positive goals."

An Ideal Model

Are you not pursuing an ideal model that is incapable of mobilizing support?

"Yes, of course, it is an ideal model and we have been disappointed in it many times. On the organizational level, however, VS has represented positions that

are so innovative--not only in the Danish context, but on the left wing in general--that they must be seen as a fantastic experiment. Some of these things are now accepted and more traditional, although we were ridiculed for the way in which we structured the party in the beginning: no chairman, but collective leadership. That was totally ridiculed. Important political decisions are made not by the parliamentary group, but by an elected leadership of nonprofessionals. That was also ridiculed. We have protection for minorities and freedom to form factions. That was all ridiculed, as well."

"Of course, we have had our share of disappointments with this and I have made no secret of the fact that the protection of minorities has sometimes been used for ridiculous forms of sectarianism. Still, some of these points form an extremely unusual experiment that, despite everything, has lasted for 17 years. At every congress, someone has said that the party was about to fall apart. This could still happen at some time or another, but so far we have gone on, despite all the disappointments. We have also gained tremendous experience. No one else has dared to pay the high price involved in such an experiment."

Not Fault Of Party Structure

A good party structure may be fine, but what if your party is seen as a sectarian discussion group?

"I do not believe the organization of our party has ever prevented us from having influence. We have been kept away from direct influence. With three exceptions, we have never directly taken part in negotiations. But our insistence on party democracy has never been the problem. It is the same reasons for which the Social Democrats could not stand SF during the first 10 years. On the other hand, I would say that we have had no problems, on the few occasions we have been involved--even though compromises were involved. The first case was the property tax moratorium of 1978. The second case was the condominium freeze in early 1979."

"It is possible, however, that a situation could arise in which there is a conflict between our desire for party democracy and our desire to be included in major agreements."

Special Congress Postponed

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Mar 86 p 2

[Article by Jesper P. Jespersen]

[Text] Despite common long-range goals and some reconciliation between the extreme wings, the VS leadership still disagrees on what the basic position of the party actually is. The extraordinary congress has been postponed until September.

The approximately 1,200 members of VS will have some time to decide what political line the party should follow. Consequently, an extraordinary party congress that had been planned for May will be postponed until September of this year.

The three groups within the VS leadership--the red realists, the middle, and the left opposition--still disagree on how far the party should go in seeking compromises with a future labor government.

Took Exception

This was made clear at a press conference yesterday at which Elisabeth Bruun Olesen of the left opposition took exception with almost every form of compromise, while red realist Anne Grete Holmsgaard told centerist Keld Albrechtsen that she still believed in the importance of the extraparliamentary struggle. In more conciliatory tones, however, she said that there was no point in rejecting all compromise. "The people can still tell the difference between SF and VS," she said.

They also used the opportunity to stress that neither Anne Grete Holmsgaard, Jorgen Lenger, nor anyone else was leaving the party.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STATISTICIAN REEXAMINES IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
7 Feb 86 p 4

[Article by Prof Dr Max Wingen, president of the State Statistical Office of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Stuttgart: "A Way out of the Demographic Dilemma? Shifts in the Social Budget"]

[Text] In recent sociopolitical discussion a theory turns up time and again that offhand is quite plausible sounding, which, however proves to be problematical with a closer look and viewed in the long run even quite dangerous. It is argued that a one-sided picture of increased burdens for the gainfully working generation arises if the great increase in the ratio of the aged to be derived from the various demographic model calculations alone is stressed--at least in terms of trends; this increase in the number of elderly and very old people related to the number of (potentially) gainfully working persons (between 20 and 60 years of age) is accompanied by a more or less corresponding reduction of the youth quotient, so that the total share of burden, after it will initially be even slightly declining in the next few years, by the year 2020 will be at level once again that is barely higher than the present level. The course of the total share of the burden, in final analysis decisive, is basically not so worrisome in light of an "overall consideration"--precisely because of the offset provided by the compensating reduced expenditures for the coming generation, it is claimed.

This argumentation figure deserves special attention because of its importance for the discussion of central sociopolitical aspects in intergenerative view. To come to an important point of the result first: As much as the population statistical data appear to confirm this theory, as little does this view really withstand profound consideration, especially for the following reasons:

- (1) The demographic age quotients cannot be automatically equated with economic burden shares. For one thing, demographic age quotients are solely based on the populations' age structure; the generation not yet gainfully working or no longer gainfully working delimited according to age groups is then compared to the potentially gainfully working generation also delimited by age groups. However, economic load shares try to measure the effective economic load of the actively gainfully working. This economic load consists in the fact that the gainfully working population transfers part of the social product to the

Model Calculation on the Future Development of the Total
Population by Age Groups

Altersgruppe (1)	Stand (2) 31.12.1983	Modellrechnung (3)				
		1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
in Millionen (8)						
(4) unter 20	14,9	12,2	11,6	9,7	8,1	7,6
(5) 20 - unter 60	34,1	35,0	32,2	30,2	27,2	22,2
(6) 60 u. älter	12,3	12,9	14,6	15,0	15,6	16,7
(7) insgesamt	61,3	60,1	58,4	54,9	50,8	46,4
in v.H. (9)						
(4) unter 20	24	20	20	18	16	16
(5) 20 - unter 60	56	58	55	55	53	48
(6) 60 u. älter	20	22	25	27	31	36

Key:

1. Age group
2. Status as of 31 Dec 83
3. Model calculation
4. Under 20
5. 20 to under 60
6. 60 and older
7. Total
8. in million
9. in %

German population: present fertility level, further slight reduction of mortality rate; foreign population: emigration up to 1990; immigration again after the turn of the century.

(New Model calculation of the Federal Statistical Office; Model I)

not gainfully working population (not only to the not yet gainfully working youngsters and the no longer gainfully working old people, but also to the not gainfully active and unemployed), namely in monetary form or in kind, within the framework of private or public, individual or collective institutions.

How big the difference between both proportional shares may be is demonstrated for example by the legal national pension insurance scheme (GRV) in the comparison of pensioner's quotients (ratio of those receiving pensions to those making contributions) and demographic age quotients: If the calculations are made on the quotient of pensioners, the latter provides a clearly more unfavorable picture than the purely demographic age quotient. The quotient of pensioners among other things, cannot be directly derived from the demographic age quotient because it is influenced just as much by changes in the average age at entry into gainful work and at entry into the pension phase as by changes in the participation in gainful work by married women. According to available model calculations, this load in the GRV expressed in the quotient of pensioners will experience a comparatively greater increase in the coming decades and will grow continuously (instead of easing up in certain periods, as the course of the demographic age quotient could suggest). To determine the economic load shares, in the second place, data are required on the share of the national income which the gainfully working turn over to the children and the aged (not gainfully working); information is needed on the relative income level of children and the aged. Corresponding data which comprise all incomes and are consistently calculated at present are not available for the FRG; this is true especially because the care of the children and the aged is the responsibility of very different social institutions and because private and public payments in kind and in money can be calculated and compared only with difficulty. Therefore it cannot be stated with satisfactory accuracy whether children "cost" society more than the aged do. Thus analogously the same applies to statements on the effects of load or easing of the changing age structure.

At any rate some aspects on the question of load or easing effects in the redistribution between the generations can be mentioned, which suggest treating the initially mentioned theory with some critical reserve:

(a) The expenditures for the aged could grow disproportionately with the increase in their share in the population as a whole because in our country there exists an especially high new and replacement demand of infrastructure facilities particularly in the field of the (outpatient and in-hospital) care for the aged. A further factor in the increase lies hereby in the costs of the diseases of the disproportionately growing group of "the very old," particularly the (quite few) tangible age-specific disease cost profiles indicate a clear increase in health expenditures with rising age (thus in the latest health budget for Baden-Wuerttemberg).

(b) As regards the children and youth load share, it should be further remembered for the transformation of the demographic quotient into an economic load share that the expenditures for the coming generation for several reasons will not proportionately decline with the reduction in the number of children and youths:

--In the infrastructure area, the "lead principle" will achieve greater importance than the "utilization principle," this especially under the aspect of regional differentiation. The per-capita costs for the infrastructure benefits for the coming generation will increase because of the declining utilization (cost degression in public infrastructure investments in reverse outlook).

--In the private family households, the relative per capita expenditures for fewer but better educated children are likely to rise; particularly in the transfer benefits for children, the growing share of one parent taking care of the education (mostly mothers) could lead to the need to make up for the relative poverty of that one parent.

--Especially to be taken into consideration is the growing share of foreign children and youths to be educated, whose social and educational integration is likely to have the effect of requiring above-average expenditures.

--The expenditures of the state and society, too, for the education of the coming generation will tend to go up in the interest of maintaining economic efficiency on an international level.


(2) Even if the wish were nevertheless to orient oneself in the assessment of the economic load factors primarily on the changing demographic age quotients, an additional connection is to be viewed: There is no frictionless assignment of social product shares in the changing shares of the young and the old running in opposite direction. Infrastructure investments once made of special needs cannot be simply converted to satisfy other kinds of needs. Thus educational institutions for children cannot easily be converted into care institutions for the aged. Here exist considerable objective and personal limitations that are likely to lead to the situation where the adaptation of the performances to the different development of the demographic children and aged shares proves to be relatively unelastic and thus also expensive. In addition, in a regional respect frictions arise in case of an attempted equalization of burdens.

(3) It is undoubtedly correct that because of productivity increases and the real wage increases possible as a result could be paid for by comparatively clearly (especially after the turn of the century) higher rates of contributions to the legal pension insurance fund without absolute loss of prosperity. But here, too, a simple alternate calculation against less high expenditures for the coming generation are very problematical. For, to take care of the aged as well as the children, a specific social product structure is required, characterized among other things by a high share of services tied up with individuals.

In the form of (increased) contributions to the legal pension insurance fund, claims are transferred to the social product. To the extent that thus products are in demand in which the gains in productivity have made these increased incomes possible (especially the processing industry), no significant problems arise to start with. However, where such transferred purchasing power is directed to personal services, the gainfully working persons required for this purpose must be available, who thus cannot share in the achievement of the potentially possibly increased productivity gains. What is also involved is a problem of the available "hands" in addition to a more efficiently set-up

POPULATION DEVELOPMENT

Development of the Quotients of the Aged¹ and of the Youths² According to Model I, as Well as the Overall Load Quotient³ According to Models I and III of the Federal Statistical Office



1. Quotient of the Aged: Persons 60 years of age and over : persons of 20 to below 60 years of age
2. Quotient of the Youths: Persons below 20 years of age : persons of 20 to below 60 years of age
3. Overall load quotient: Age quotient + youth quotient

Key:

- A. %
- B. Years
- C. Total load quotient, Federal Statistical Office (new variant, Model III)
- D. Quotient of the aged, Federal Statistical Office (new variant, Model I)
- E. Quotient of youths, Federal Statistical Office (new variant, Model I)
- F. Overall load quotient, Federal Statistical Office (new variant, Model I)

material goods offer. But the gainfully working persons will decrease in the long run not only in their relative share but also in their absolute number. According to the latest model calculation of the official statistics, the 20 to 60 year group could decline from about 35 million in 1990 to about 27 and 22 million in 2020 and 2030, respectively. In addition it should of course be taken into consideration here that in addition to the gainfully working persons additional providers of services could be found in the unpaid field.

(4) Finally--this, as a rule, is completely overlooked--the reference that a growing age load share must be decisively qualified in terms of its apportionment in an "overall consideration" under inclusion of the opposite youth load share tacitly--or even expressly--starts from the assumption that sooner or later the birth rates will increase anyhow. Without going into reasons for the reality content of such a view, the following should be noted for our statement of the problem: It is this assumption in particular that would boil down to adding a later rising share of the youth load to the meanwhile clearly increased load share of the aged, which further correspondingly increases the overall load share. (This can be derived quite vividly from a variant of the latest model calculations in which for later years a clearly higher fertility level is assumed than it is for now). This effect would be all the more serious the later this increase in the youth load share would occur. If there were any significant opportunity at all to so weaken, if not to eliminate, the already preprogrammed demographic imbalances with their manifold effects that are to be evaluated as negative, then the next approximately 10 years would provide more favorable conditions than the time starting with the turn of the

century. At any rate similar statements apply to the indispensable adjustment measures in the various fields of action of politics and administration. For the further development of a social policy and sociopolitics which are family oriented and at the same time demographically accentuated, in other words which are in tune with the generations, there is, thus, not much more time left. It can definitely be developed as a consistent component of the policy concept of social order of the social market economy if only its intellectual foundations are taken seriously enough. The betting should much rather be on a future-oriented political strategy interested in expanding personal familial scope of action in legislation and administration, in economy and working life--even though its effect cannot be precisely predetermined--than on the quite questionable and rash demographic-statistical offsets. In final analysis they confront the coming generations with the task of having to master problem situations which are lastingly preshaped by present individual and political decisions--and omissions. This would hardly be compatible with a social ethic of "long-range responsibility," in this case for the coming generation.

12356

CSO: 3620/599

POLITICAL

NORWAY

LEIF ELDRING REAPPOINTED SVALBARD SHERIFF

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Feb 86 p 10

[Article by Torleif Andreassen: "Leif Eldring Will Be Sheriff Again: 'Good Relations with Russians on Svalbard'"]

[Text] "I have the impression that relations with the Russians on Svalbard are good. And I figure that they will continue to be," Justice Ministry Councilor Leif Eldring says to AFTENPOSTEN. At the cabinet meeting today he was again appointed sheriff on Svalbard. Eldring, who also took care of the office during the years 1974-78, makes no secret of the fact that he is very happy in our northern island kingdom.

The 52-year-old Eldring is an outdoorsman--and bitten by the "polar bug." Now he will have opportunities for long ski trips large portions of the year.

"Yes, but it is not for this reason that I am going to Svalbard," the ministry councilor smiles, who adds that he hopes there will be time to use his skis from time to time.

Leif Eldring knows this group of islands very well, especially from his last term as sheriff. Incidentally, in 1970 he was for a brief time assistant sheriff. Since he was the State's top representative there Leif Eldring has visited Svalbard one or two times a year.

Tourism

[Question] A debate has been in progress regarding to what extent more tourism ought to be ventured on, or not, on Svalbard. What do you think?

[Answer] "I think Svalbard and Norway are best served by keeping tourism at the present limited level. This is due first and foremost to the vulnerable natural environment up there."

Leif Eldring is a quiet and friendly man with a firm foot on the ground. There is often a twinkle in the corner of his eye. There is one when he gets the question everyone associated with Svalbard gets: Have polar bears been seen? And Eldring has, several times:

"The closest I have been to a polar bear is 100 meters. This is close enough for me!"

He will come considerably closer to polar bears in the cozy log cabin at the sheriff's residence. There there is a huge stuffed hulk standing on two legs. Both it and old friends will get to see Eldring again on 1 July. Then he will again receive responsibility for Norwegian law's being complied with on Svalbard.

8831

CSO: 3639/88

POLITICAL

PORUGAL

BETTER REPRESENTATION OF ARAB FORCES IN LISBON URGED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 4 Mar 86 p 8

[Excerpts] A verse by Goethe says that "he who recognize himself and knows others will also be able to recognize this: the East and the West are inseparably linked."

The cultural, economic and political relations between Portugal and the Arab countries should be reassessed within the context of our participation in the European Economic Community. It would be well to recall that the Arabs are today Europe's main economic partner, which has led the EEC countries to pursue a cautious policy of rapprochement.

The dialogue between Europe and the Arab world has been yielding considerable fruit for the countries involved, which are naturally inclined to defend their own positions. Thus Portugal will be confronted with situations involving more stable relationships, which are the product of realistic foreign policies such as we have never been able to achieve, and we will have to proceed with political flexibility, such as to harvest the dividends European integration makes possible in this vital sector. Our country will have positions to balance and defend in the EEC bodies, which are involved in cooperation with the Arabs, on pain of missing the boat once again if it does not.

The Spanish Example

Our Spanish neighbors, who are also European partners now, have been much better able to "grasp" the historic legacy of the Arabs, converting it into intensive bilateral cooperation, which has never ceased to develop.

It might be noted by way of example that the Spaniards have been heavily influenced by Arab investments and the placement of capital coming from the Middle East. Luxury tourist projects have been built there with such funds, and Spain is a priority destination for Arab tourists, who are an inexhaustible source of foreign exchange.

But it must be remembered that Spain created its "defenses" through carefully drafted agreements with its Arab partners. Apart from having efficient facilities for communication with this area, Spain requires that its ports and airports be the "final destinations," thus preventing an extension of Arab

lines to our country. This is an issue which must urgently be dealt with, because the entire economic mechanism depends basically on transportation. Spain will have to review this and other positions, and it will not undertake this task willingly.

On the other hand, and this too is in the minds of Portuguese diplomats, it is a fact that the intensification of Portuguese-Arab relations on the economic and cultural levels cannot be carried out without political solidarity with those peoples as its counterpart.

Overall relations with the Arab world will without a doubt involve solidarity with the Palestinian cause, the real point of convergence and unity among the Arabs (even though the appearances are divergent, as a result of our general lack of background for understanding the Islamic world in all its grandeur and diversity).

Portugal and the PLO

Along this line of thinking, one of the steps which Arab diplomatic circles in Lisbon are awaiting is the granting of diplomatic status to the PLO in the Portuguese capital. This status, which the PLO enjoys in the other EEC capitals, was personally promised to Yasser Arafat earlier by Minister Jaime Gama, but the successive domestic political upsets, linked with the vicissitudes in the development of the international situation, have never allowed its implementation.

At a time when it is crucial to eliminate old stereotypes and to become free of bureaucratic ways of thinking (we are recalling the fine words of Dr Mario Soares about our full integration in Europe), the steps taken in Portuguese diplomacy must be agile, and there is sufficient gymnastic ability for the purpose, provided the pertinent political support is forthcoming. In this connection, it would not be excessive to emphasize that the crisis provoked between Spain and the Arab nations by the recognition of the Zionist state by our neighbors opens up for Portugal a unique opportunity for a simple gesture of goodwill on the diplomatic front--recognition, to our own advantage, of the office representing the PLO in Lisbon. Elementary, my dear Pires de Miranda.

The establishment in Lisbon of embassies representing Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Jordan and Syria, among other nations which our diplomats are contemplating, is a step we hope to see taken shortly. To achieve this we must motivate the respective governments, by increased diplomatic initiative in this area.

5157

CSO:3542/72

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES, PROBLEMS OF PS ANALYZED

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 11 Mar 86 p 2

[Article by Jose Miguel Judice]

[Text] The Socialist Party is faced with a great opportunity and two complex problems. The opportunity is provided by the presidential victory of Soares, in itself. The problems are the choice of the successor to the former secretary general and the definition and implementation of a strategy which will allow the socialists to win government power. The opportunity is the cause of the two problems, but it nonetheless continues to be celebrated joyfully by this party, because the alternative would be to have problems without any opportunity.

The winning of the presidency by Soares, however much above the party the winner might place himself, is a precious victory for the PS. This is true on the one hand because to achieve it, it was necessary to rally the votes of more than half the citizens of Portugal, many of whom had never voted for the PS and who responded to the message concerning the "useful vote" against the right wing for the first time. This is a message which will be heeded again in other elections. It is true on the other hand because the popularity of Soares in Belem will initially be higher than that of the PS itself, and because of this, it will always provide an advantage to the socialists, who can present themselves to the voters as the party closest to the president. Thus we see the reason the socialists are happy with the presidential triumph of the first among them. But as I have already said, it is not all roses--the opportunity has created two problems.

The first of the problems is that of the successor to Soares, which would have been easier had he not won. It would have been easier had he not gone to the second round, because this would have meant a successor against Soares. It would have been easier had he been defeated tangentially, because in such a case the succession process would have been openly directed and organized by Soares. But the triumph and his resulting withdrawal from the party have created the classic problem of full replacement of the leader at the peak of his prestige (as happened in the PSD after the tragic death of Sa Carneiro), with the aggravating, although happy, factor that he continues to be a semipresident, listening from Belem to the events within this party with an interest understandably greater than he would have in events in any other.

The succession process can be completed on the basis of several hypotheses, ranging from a search for a new leader who would be something like a copy of the old one to a complete turnaround with a new type of leader, and including hybrid forms of proceeding, which would include collective leadership plans. The choice might be Almeida Santos, Gama, Constancio or someone else. But any one of these solutions will inevitably mean a weakening of the party. This is true on the one hand because no solution will ensure the unity of the membership, and worse than that, of the faithful voters. And on the other hand, since none of the possible successors has the charisma or the prestige which would enable him to match Soares, his successor will be viewed as a temporary solution by his competitors, as Balsemao could certify.

But the triumph of Soares creates a second problem. It is the strategic issue which has to do on the one hand with the establishment of the "timing" for the effort to win power, and on the other, with the policy of possible and probable alliances. In fact, it can be said that the goal of winning power is better served by a crisis which will lead to elections in 1987, but the goal of leftist revolution with the PS playing the leading role is better served by keeping the present government in office for some time, if possible until the end of the normal term, in order to provide time for the development of a new party, with new political personnel and new ideas.

But the strategic issue also has to do with the alliance policy. In reality, the PS is offered two alternatives, one involving a closer relationship with the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party], in an effort to create a preelectoral alliance with a viable chance of victory, or on the other hand, closer relations with the PSD, with a view to trying to reestablish the central bloc thesis. There is no other possible solution, at least as long as the PCP remains unchanged, and as long as there is no radical alteration in the electoral system (and such an alteration is not likely to be accepted by the president of the republic who would have to pay the PCP that price).

Now both of the possible alternatives are problematical. This is true first of all because an alliance with the PRD would presume that party's definition, and there would always be the risk that neither of the possible successors to Soares would be notable enough to measure up to Eanes. This means that not only is it clear that the PRD wants a coalition, but also that it seems improbable that Ramalho Eanes would agree to be the candidate for the post of deputy prime minister under the likes of Jaime Gama.

But it also, and secondly, seems entirely improbable that the PSD would agree to a coalition with the PS, and if it did, that the coalition could fail to be organized on the basis of the political leadership of Cavaco Silva's men. And it is hard to see how a recent and challenged leader in the PS could demand anything less than leadership of the bloc the party had joined, because if he did not do so, he would be annihilated by his rivals.

What can be concluded from this, and it would be well if the PS understood this, is that the party of Mario Soares meets every requirement for being the "sick man" in the last 2 years of the 1980s. It has an opportunity, but it is not going to be able to use it. It has two problems, and no viable and

efficient solution to them can be seen. And there is nothing worse than missing an opportunity when all the factors are seemingly favorable and augur a better future. It will not be better, and thus the successor to Soares will be a victim, in the best of propitiatory hypotheses.

5157
CSO:3542/74

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

CARLSSON WEAK IN AREAS OF ECONOMICS, SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Mar 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Ingvar Carlsson"]

[Text] It was formally confirmed on Monday that Ingvar Carlsson has been named acting party chairman for the Social Democrats. Calling a special party congress was never considered. There is every indication, then, that the party board's choice will be confirmed at next year's regular congress.

Ingvar Carlsson was anxious to emphasize continuity in policy as he met the press for the first time in his new role. "Policy will stay the same," he said. And there is no reason to doubt his word on that point.

Ingvar Carlsson had been very close to Olof Palme for a long time. He has been very closely involved in Social Democratic policy over the past few decades. In fact, there is no political area or any issue where it can be shown that Olof Palme and Ingvar Carlsson held differing views.

As cabinet minister, Ingvar Carlsson has been responsible for two such important areas as housing policy and education policy. After the change of government in 1982, he was Olof Palme's deputy, and it fell on him to attend to those areas where the leadership wanted to give the party a new image.

Within the party, Ingvar Carlsson has been the chief writer of party programs in recent years. Both the economic program of 1981 and the program for the future--adopted at the 1984 congress--were worked out with him in the chair.

Ingvar Carlsson's record is therefore as good an indication as any that Social Democratic policy is not going to change on any essential point. It is true that one of his tasks was to take charge of the reappraisal. But even that was done entirely in keeping with the party line.

The program for the future therefore contains very little in the way of new thinking or reappraisal as far as old attitudes are concerned. If anything, its distinctive feature is support for traditional Social Democratic policy. When work on the program began, there were great expectations that it would vitalize Social Democratic policy.

But as the work proceeded, it was gradually channeled into familiar paths, and the final result was surprisingly anemic. It may be that Ingvar Carlsson was influenced by his experience with work on the emergency program a few years earlier, when relatively ambitious attempts to reexamine old Social Democratic truths had run into opposition within the party, forcing the emergency group to return quickly to the old policy.

The new chairman of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] may have a radically different personality than his predecessor, but he operates within the same material reality and the same economic environment and must deal with the same conflicting interests. There are many indications that the political debate will take on a more objective tone with Ingvar Carlsson as SDP chairman. But it is far from certain that the conflicts and antagonisms will be dramatically reduced as a result.

Like his predecessor, Ingvar Carlsson is going to give solidarity within the party priority over agreement across party lines. The simple fact is that as leader of a Social Democratic Party that is far less homogeneous than we usually imagine it to be, he will have no choice.

A Social Democratic leader today must take considerably greater pains to unite strong and frequently conflicting interests within the movement than was the case only 25 years ago. And the more energy that is expended to hold things together within the party, the less scope and energy there is for compromise with others.

It would therefore be wrong to entertain too much hope that with Ingvar Carlsson as SDP chairman, a great peace is going to settle over Swedish politics. This is especially true in that the SDP has long had problems of legitimacy in relation to its own supporters.

Those problems are a consequence of the fact that traditional Social Democratic policy is inadequate for meeting the demands of a new day. Ingvar Carlsson's big weakness is that he has had little to do with economics and social issues. His qualifications for pushing through a new way of thinking in those areas are therefore quite limited. And to some extent, of course, this has already been confirmed.

At the same time, it is primarily in those areas that the Social Democrats must reassess their policy if it is their ambition to retain their dominant position on the political stage.

It is reasonable to assume that Ingvar Carlsson will be allowed a rather lengthy honeymoon. It may even last through the next election. But it is not likely that he will be able to initiate a new era of understanding in Swedish politics. Besides, the problems are too great, and the movement is too busy dealing with its internal conflicts.

11798
CSO: 3650/157

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

SECOND EUROPEAN FIGHTER PLANE PROPOSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Mar 86 p 12

[Article by Jacques Isnard: "Defense: Under Negotiation This Week in Rome and Madrid, Two European Fighter Aircraft Projects for a Market Worth Fr 600 Billion"]

[Text] An important week for the European military aviation, with a triple meeting. In Rome, on Wednesday 12 March, the British, Italian, FRG and Spanish delegates to armament will meet their French counterpart, Mr Emile Blanc.

Still in Rome, on Thursday 13 and Friday 14 March, at the initiative of the French, the delegates to armament of the European countries belonging to the Atlantic alliance will discuss the possible creation of a Military Aviation Study Group (GEPAM). In Madrid, on Thursday 13 March, the British, Italian, FRG and Spanish ministers of defense will hold consultations. Three meetings, a single stake: the market, estimated at Fr 500-600 billion, for 1 or 2 new European fighter aircraft, 1,500 units of which would be built.

Last summer in Turin, Europe divided into two camps on military aeronautics. On the one hand, the English, the West Germans, the Italians and the Spaniards formed the idea of designing a single fighter aircraft, the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA). On the other hand, the French found themselves alone with their European fighter aircraft program (ACE) derived from a demonstration unit developed by Dassault-Breguet, the Rafale. Since then, the Dutch, the Danish, the Norwegians and the Belgians have come closer to the French to lay the foundations of a cooperation.

Last September, France proposed to establish so-called "cross" participations in Europe: the manufacturers of the ACE, presented as a versatile aircraft for air-to-ground and air-to-air missions, offered to collaborate to the design of some equipment for the EFA, designed to be an aircraft specialized in air-to-air combat. As a counterpart, EFA manufacturers would participate in the production of some systems intended for the ACE. This cross cooperation would not involve any obligation to purchase: EFA buyers would not have to buy the ACE, nor ACE buyers the EFA.

In Rome, on Wednesday 12 March, partners to the EFA agreement will hear the French delegate to armament, Mr Blanc, who will tell them in which fields they might collaborate with ACE proponents. Actually, three cooperation levels are said to be considered: joint production of equipment, joint assembly of subassemblies, and pooling of technologies. Several fields of application are involved: hydraulic systems, electric systems, auxiliary equipment, air conditioning, navigation systems, data processing, radio and computers.

20 Percent of the Cost

All these items of equipment, plus others, represent up to 50 percent of the value of a modern fighter aircraft. This shows the importance of a cross cooperation agreement between the EFA and the ACE, if it leads to savings on both sides. The French like to imagine a collaboration scenario which, although not reaching the goal of 50 percent of the aircraft value, could still bear on 20 percent of the project cost.

The following day in Madrid, the ministers of defense of the four EFA partner countries will be informed of the French proposals as presented to their delegates in Rome. They are not expected to give any answer yet. That is because the British, the Italians, the West Germans and the Spaniards already find it difficult enough to agree among themselves on the EFA project.

Information repeated by the press of these four countries actually mentions the existence of differences concerning the aircraft characteristics and performance, in spite of the initial Turin agreement, which was for an aircraft weighing 9,750 kg. The Germans, in particular, insist on making a lightweight, and therefore less costly, aircraft, while the British, judging by the demands of the Royal Air Force, would prefer an aircraft weighing up to 12.5 tons.

These differences on the very definition of the aircraft will lead to additional delays, of the order of 6 months, in negotiations among the four interested countries. Especially since problems have also surfaced in setting up the legal and industrial framework responsible for the program: in principle, it is in Munich, and side by side with the Panavia club which administers the Tornado program, that the European consortium responsible for the implementation of the EFA project is to be set up.

Variable Geometry

To spare Europe another such misadventure, France intends to propose to all of its European partners in the Atlantic alliance to build a "catchall structure" designed more precisely to ensure cooperation among the European aeronautical industry already from the design stage of a military aircraft. Known under the provisional name of "Military Aircraft Study Group" (or GEPAM), this catchall structure would not be a supranational institution but an industrial forum that would examine long-term needs, look for coordination methods and define common standards.

A "variable geometry" structure, as a French diplomat called it, which would take into account each partner's industrial power, its technological level and the needs of its air force, the GEPAM would be interested in the upstream studies and exploratory developments of military aircraft programs, whether for a fighter aircraft, a transport aircraft, a helicopter, engines, missiles or electronic systems for these projects.

The need of the Europeans for such a consultation forum for the end of the century will be debated on Friday 14 March in Rome by the delegates to armament of the countries belonging to the Independent European Program Group (GIEP), i.e. European states belonging to the Atlantic Alliance. They should take this opportunity to prepare the meeting of their ministers of defense, which is scheduled to take place in Madrid in April and is expected to decide on the French proposal to create the GEPAM.

9292
CSO: 3519/143

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DEFENSE OF SCANDINAVIAN PENINSULA

Joint Defense Deterrent Seen

Stockholm INTERNATIONELLA STUDIER in Swedish No. 1, 1986 p 12

[Text] No matter what anyone might imagine, the heading for this subject section is less a challenge than a statement of facts which cannot be eliminated by any alliance border: that Norway and Sweden share a peninsula, that many, perhaps the majority, of potential cases of war involve both countries simultaneously and that the result of this is that our respective defense efforts create a joint deterrent to an attacker.

No one believes that this will have consequences for the completely different directions chosen by our countries in the matter of alliance affiliation. But it is important to contemplate those problems as well which are not normally dealt with in the security-political debate: how the defense systems in Norway and Sweden affect each other, how various attack scenarios may unfold in the respective country and what forces and structures exist or are needed for the tasks which are perceived.

It has become a trivial remark that the Nordic area has acquired greatly increased importance in strategic connections. The expansion of the Murmansk base, the struggle for the Sea of Norway and advanced reconnaissance stations are factors of significance. However, nearly every expert observer emphasizes that the situation in the north is stable and that the level of strength on both sides is reasonable. Therefore, the development which has meant that the division between central front and periphery has become less distinct is at least as essential. Militarily as well, the world is becoming more of a unity, with the attendant risks of escalation of limited conflicts.

Technology and Security Policy

Stockholm INTERNATIONELLA STUDIER in Swedish No 1, 1986, pp 13-19

[Article by Lars Killander]

[Text] Military technology and security policy are factors which are intimately connected. The increased range of aircraft, for example, expands the operational areas and thus constitutes a greater threat to the

FÖRSVARET

A W E

S I N D I

N A V I S K A

H A L V O N

(6) Större NATO-övningar

Årliga
NATO
övningar

Sovjetisk
övningar
bl a flyg
och marin

(1) Nordkap
Murmansk

(2)

(1)

Key:

(1) Soviet
air and
naval
exercises

(2) Annual
NATO ex-
ercises

(3) North Cape

(4) Norway

(5) Sweden

(6) Major NATO
exercises

(7) Major WP
exercises

(8) Violations
along the
Swedish coast

(9) Radio in-
telligence

(8) Kränkningar runt svenska kusten

(9) ⚡ = Signalspaning

Skala 1:7 500 000

environment. This alters the security policy preconditions as well. Electronic development, computer technology and arms and munitions technology are other examples of technological changes with security policy consequences.

Military technology is also connected with geography. Through technological advances it is possible today to use areas which previously were impossible to utilize for military purposes. Among these are space and the ocean regions. The Arctic Ocean is an area which is developing into a region of major strategic interest.

Technological, geographical and security policy factors are interconnected in the Nordic countries. Previously there was talk in military connections of the Northern Flank--the Nordic region is, after all, a flank region for NATO's central front in Central Europe. But precisely because of the technological development this flank concept is increasingly called into question. Expanded ranges for NATO aircraft and improved communications and command functions have transformed our region into a highly integrated part of the central front from a strategic point of view.

The ocean areas around Norway are of major importance to the Soviet nuclear-armed submarine fleet, to the Soviet capability of cutting off the essential sea lanes of communication between the United States and Western Europe and to the defense of the Soviet Union against nuclear attacks.

In the same way as the area is strategically important to the Soviet Union, it is equally important to the other superpower. The Nordic region has more directly come to be affected by the conflicts between the superpowers. The strategic interests which affect the area have acquired increased significance and developed stronger ties to both the North Atlantic and Central Europe. This development is likely to continue.

In a potential conflict both sides will deploy large resources in order to prevent each other from gaining control of the ocean areas and the adjacent land areas.

Consequences for Norway

This will naturally have major consequences for Norway. To NATO the Norwegian territory is a highly important area for early warning and defense.

It is also important to prevent Norwegian territory from becoming a staging area for Soviet operations at sea or in the air.

Since the Soviet Navy has the capability of dominating the ocean areas around Norway, there is great risk that the country will be located behind advanced Soviet positions in for example the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. Against a background of this, it is official Norwegian policy for Norway's security to be dependent on a military balance in the ocean areas closest to Norway. It is within the framework for Norway's NATO membership that this balance can be maintained.

Membership in NATO is thus one of the cornerstones of Norwegian security policy. In Norwegian that cornerstone is called beroligelse--meaning calming reassurance to the surrounding world (alias the Soviet Union) that Norwegian defense measures are absolutely defensive in nature. While the national defense and membership in NATO are Norway's signal to the surrounding world that it wants to defend itself, the self-imposed restrictions in the NATO membership are an indication to the rest of the world of the defensive element.

The base policy is the oldest of the self-imposed restrictions. It came into being in 1949, when Norway joined the NATO, as a guarantee to the Soviet Union not to accept foreign NATO troops on Norwegian soil in peacetime.

The nuclear arms policy is the second self-imposed restriction, and it means that no nuclear weapons may be stored in or launched from Norway. However, the restriction is formulated so that in wartime the Norwegian defenses can be supplemented with outside forces which have nuclear forces at their disposal. This may only take place after permission from Norwegian authorities.

The training restrictions, finally, mean that foreign NATO troops may not train east of the 24th longitude, that is to say in principle not in the county of Finnmark.

The interplay between "avskrekking og beroligelse" [deterrance and reassurance] imposes great demands on the security policy. On the one hand it is important not have too low a deterrent profile, for then the credibility of the defense efforts is in danger of shrinking.

On the other hand, the defense measures must be so moderate that they appear clearly defensive.

Nordic Stability

But it is not only for its own sake that Norway is practicing the "avskrekking-beroligelse" policy. It is included as an active element in the Nordic stability. Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Finland all benefit from the Norwegian policy. It contributes to the joint Nordic effort to achieve the greatest possible detente at the lowest possible military level.

In the same way the Swedish security policy solution is part of Nordic defense planning. Non-alignment in peacetime, aimed at neutrality in war and a "for our circumstances strong defense" is decisive for Norwegian security as well. An example of this is that the former Norwegian supreme commander, "Forsvarssjefen," in 1979 pointed out that the Swedish defense was disquieting and ought to result in a reinforcement of the defenses of southern Norway.

During the 1970's the composition of Soviet units in the vicinity of the Nordic region was altered. The fleet grew to ocean-going dimensions, the Air Force received new longer-range aircraft, the Army acquired greater mobility and speed. In official Norwegian circles there were conclusions that the

Soviet Northern Fleet could be used against Norwegian territory without diminishing its capability of playing a global role. The air forces on the Kola peninsula could, according to the same Norwegian evaluation, be used for both tactical and strategic operations. The threat against Norway was believed to have increased. Norwegian studies showed that if air supremacy over Norway was lost, the fight would on the whole be lost, not only for Norway but for all of NATO. If strategically important Norway were lost, the road would be open to Soviet attacks against the important sea lanes between the United States and Western Europe. The new threat picture came to form the basis for a number of important Norwegian decisions and studies during the 1970's.

"The Defense Commission"

In March 1978 the Norwegian Defense Commission presented its study after 4 years of work. The commission drew up the guidelines for the Norwegian defense role during the 1979-1994 15-year period. Priority was placed on the defense of northern Norway, since the region was considered most exposed during a potential attack due to its vicinity to the important Soviet base areas on the Kola peninsula.

The commission was of the further opinion that it was less likely that southern Norway would be attacked in the first stage of a war. An invasion there is considered unlikely until an enemy is in possession of Denmark and the Baltic outlets.

The fact that northern Norway is so important in Norwegian defense policy does not mean that an attack up there is the most likely in all situations. But only Norwegian forces can meet a surprise attack due to restrictions in the base policy. For that reason the Norwegian units up there must have such strength and composition that they can withstand an attack until allied reinforcements arrive.

In addition to the fact that the restrictions in the base policy prescribe that national units are to be stationed in northern Norway, it is also important, purely from the view of security policy, to treat the region with priority. A relative weakening of the defense of northern Norway could lead to a gutting of the deterrence capability to such an extent that an attacker sees a chance, or even an advantage, in attacking northern Norway. In such a situation, the official reasoning goes, the United States could place naval forces in the Norwegian Sea/Barents Sea in order to counter a Soviet attack. Such a direct confrontation could lead to an escalation of the conflict to the nuclear level.

This reasoning is central. The question is whether the technological development, and the strategic/tactical development connected with it, today makes it impossible for Norway to prevent, through its defense contribution, a superpower confrontation in the Norwegian Sea/Barents Sea.

The Defense Commission believed that the Norwegian defense budget should be increased by four percent per year in real terms during the 1979-83 five-year period, three percent per year during the 1984-88 period and two percent per year during the 1989-93 period.

The budget increase was motivated with, among other things, the need for major new procurements after the U. S. arms aid to Norway had ceased in the early 1970's. The mobility, fire power and protection of the Army brigades should be improved, new coast artillery installation were to be created--in particular in northern Norway and in Trondelag--and new minesweepers and submarines were to be purchased. The Air Force was to be supplied with 72 new F 16 aircraft.

But economic realities spoke another language. The real increase in the defense budget for the period 1979-83 stopped at three percent, that is to say one percent less than the guidelines of the Defense Commission.

The effect of this is today (fall 1985) that the investment budget lags behind by about 2.5 billion Norwegian kronor, which corresponds to the established structural goal for an Army brigade. The lag, seen as a whole, is estimated to be 10-15 billion Norwegian kronor for the entire 15-year period. As an example may be mentioned that only in order to recapture what was lost during the 1979-83 period, the real increase in the defense budget must be seven percent per year for the rest of the planning period.

The reasons for the lopsided budget development is partly that operational costs have been greater than anticipated, partly that standard prices for defense materiel have grown faster than inflation--in real terms 2-3 percent annually.

This naturally poses major problems and causes a widening gap between structural goals and available means. A development which thus resembles the Swedish one.

In concrete terms the result of the altered preconditions is that the modernization of the military forces, primarily in southern Norway, has been postponed. This in a situation when, as was mentioned, standard prices for defense materiel continue to rise in terms of real money. It will therefore become considerably more expensive to modernize an Army brigade in 1990 in real kronor than it is today.

It has not even been possible to undertake proposed measures affecting the defense of northern Norway as planned. Among them is a slower rate of expansion for coast artillery installations, a smaller number of submarines than calculated, no Penguin III missiles (ASM) until 1988 and also no new minesweepers.

In the study the Defense Commission described the national defense capability as just as important as the allied reinforcements. But even the first five-year plan (St. Meld. 94, 1978-1979) after the memorandum of the Defense

Commission contained an interesting note. It said in the plan that economic realities made an implementation of the commission's guidelines impossible at the proposed rate. Then comes the main point:

"On the other hand, the principal intentions of the commission's proposal should be implemented. This means that the defense can be reinforced in the productive manner. Measures aimed at receiving allied aid should be given priority above measures which reinforce the national defense in those instances where allied help is considered to provide the best defense effect."

This note should mainly be regarded as a way to pave the way for the decision to stockpile materiel for a U. S. Marine infantry brigade in Trondelag (MAB). That decision was taken in 1981. It also legitimizes decisions to back other allied reinforcement measures such as allied air forces to COB [collocated operating bases] airfields (readied for allied reinforcement) and to other units.

The reinforcement policy is not a new element in Norwegian security policy. On the other hand, it has acquired increased importance at the rate of expansion of the Soviet capacity.

On the part of Norway it involves making the NATO membership credible--that is to say giving allied aid a chance to reach Norway in time in a crisis or in war. The background for the emphasis on the reinforcement element in Norwegian security policy is that the greater the number of prepared measures in Norway, the easier it is to obtain reinforcements when it really counts. It is essential, however, to remember that this is done while observing the "calming reassurance aspect"--that is to say the self-imposed restrictions.

In concrete terms, the emphasis on allied reinforcements has meant that Norway's contribution to jointly financed NATO projects has increased, as have national expenditures for advance stockpiles and the infrastructure around them.

The difficulties in establishing a necessary Norwegian defense structure has therefore to some extent been balanced by a concentration of reinforcements. This may appear to be adequate compensation for a deficient national defense. But it takes time for reinforcements to arrive in Norway. Calculations show that the reinforcements which can reach Norwegian territory first are allied airborne forces at COB, 48 hours after a political decision.

Soviet Capacity

The military capacity of the Soviet Union has improved at the rate of the technological gains. The air forces in the Leningrad military district and in the Baltic district have grown in a quantitative as well as a qualitative respect. The capability of the forces for rapid, surprise operations has improved considerably. The naval forces and army units have also been modernized, although the ground forces are not directly operational. Most

army units appear to be of the category 3 type, which means that it takes at least a week to put them in the required state of mobilization.

Southern Norway Also Important

The national defense of Norway has weakened, relatively seen, and the quality of the Soviet units stationed closest to the Nordic region has increased. At the same time it is not only northern Norway which is strategically important. Southern Norway as well (all of southern Norway up to and including the county of Northern Trondelag) are increasing in importance at the same rate as the technological development.

To begin with, southern Norway is important as a base region for allied air operations over the central front, BALTAP (the NATO command for Denmark and the Baltic outlets) and the Norwegian Sea/GIUK gap.

Southern Norway is also an important staging area for national forces earmarked for deployment in northern Norway.

Southern Norway has an increasingly important network of stockpiles and infrastructure for allied reinforcements.

During the critical time period--at least 48 hours--which lasts from a Norwegian political decision to ask for allied help until the reinforcements arrive, Soviet surprise attacks are entirely possible.

In order rapidly to reach targets in southern Norway the Soviet attack and fighter aircraft must take the route over Swedish territory. Bases in southern Norway would give the Soviet Union obvious advantages, such as the opportunity to hit the central front, and to be able to attack BALTAP and NATO naval forces in the Norwegian Sea and even dominating the Norwegian Sea. Further, a quick attack on allied stockpiles in southern Norway would make it more difficult, at least temporarily, for reinforcements to arrive in time.

A clear example of improved Soviet capability for attacking targets in the Nordic region is the modernization of the air defense forces in the Leningrad military district. The range of the three new types of fighters for low-altitude operation (MiG-29, MiG-31 and Su-27), together with the reconnaissance function of the new Il-76 Mainstay provides for increased opportunities for operations in over the Nordic area, both in order to cut off approach routes for NATO aircraft and incoming cruise missiles and in order to escort attack aircraft to targets in the Nordic region.

The "dual capability role" of the air defense forces of both cutting off attacking aircraft and themselves participating in tactical operations increases the risk of surprise attacks. Our ability rapidly to interpret the behavior and intentions of these air forces is made more difficult precisely by their double functions. In addition, the improved technology of the attacker means that the defender has that much less time to make the necessary political decisions for mobilization, for example.

This, therefore, is the picture. At the same time as it has been determined that Norway has become strategically important, there are not sufficient funds to provide the defense with the structure that is considered necessary.

This fact necessarily influences the security-political pattern in the Nordic region. Against the background of the increasing risk of Soviet operations for the purpose of attacking or invading large portions of Norway, the situation of Sweden is disturbing.

A surprise attack is evaluated as possible, in particular with a view to the advantages the Soviets would achieve in hitting southern Norwegian base installations before allied reinforcements have arrived. A Soviet attack in order to eliminate the national reinforcement of northern Norway (two Army brigades which are mobilized in southern Norway) is also possible. This in turn means that the defense of northern Norway is weakened, which is in the Soviet interest in later operations against the region.

Swedish Development

Official Swedish documents point out that not only southern Sweden (through the vicinity to BALTOP) and Norrland (in the vicinity of northern Norway) but central Sweden as well are potential operational areas. Furthermore, the value of Swedish territory as a base region is considered to have grown at the same rate as the increased strategic importance of northern Norway.

Simultaneously, Sweden exhibits the same development as Norway--gutting the defense structure through inflation and an increase in standard prices for defense materiel (2-4 percent in real numbers). Sweden's defense capability is shrinking relative to that of the surrounding world, at a time when the threat is growing.

Particularly disturbing is the situation of the air defense. This is shown above all by the development in the fighter aircraft sector, where the number of divisions has been cut in half since 1960. Hence, in the perspective plan for defense which was presented on 1 October 1985, the supreme commander warned that an overly small allocation of funds will jeopardize the future for three Draken fighter divisions. According to previous decisions these will have their lifetime extended while waiting for the JAS divisions to become fully operational.

From what has been said so far it is possible to draw the conclusion that the dilemma of the Nordic countries is becoming clearer: How are we to succeed in preserving regional stability in a situation in which our own capability for credible military deterrence is being gutted and the military capability of the surrounding world is improving?

The New Dimension: Unintentional Escalation

Yet another dimension is added to the problem when discussing the technological factors which are conditioned by major strategy and which have a bearing on Nordic security policy.

The problem is, briefly, the following: Changes in nuclear weapons technology make the Kola peninsula increasingly important to the superpower status of the Soviet Union. It is also becoming even more important for the United States to prevent the Soviets from using the resources they have on the Kola peninsula. The Nordic countries are viewing with concern the risk that the superpowers will "settle matters" right near us.

The strategic importance of Norway, and primarily northern Norway, in precisely this kind of scenario, has increased. One example: Increased Soviet activity in Barents Sea is likely to attract U. S. Navy attack submarines and other submarine capacity. These forces are supported by tactical aircraft and C³I capacity (English abbreviation for electronic communications and intelligence service), which can be based in northern Norway. In such a situation the Soviet Union might see an advantage in limited use of nuclear weapons against these northern Norwegian installations.

In this scenario the risk is great for unintentional escalation, that is to say that a conventional military operation would escalate into an exchange of blows with nuclear weapons. The risk of this has grown particularly around the Kola peninsula, since so much there is at stake for the Soviet Union and the United States. The defensive needs of the latter for example to eliminate the submarines of the opponent may be perceived by the former as a clearly offensive act.

The risk of unintentional escalation is a new element which influences Nordic stability. It affects primarily Norwegian security policy.

Johan Jorgen Holst writes:

"The Norwegian security posture 'reflects a dynamic triangular trade-off among considerations of deterrence, reassurance and insurance.'"

The Norwegian security policy situation is highly affected by the global ambitions of the superpowers. They make use of technological advances which have decidedly regional consequences. The improved range and double operational capability the Soviet air defense forces is an example of this. Other examples are new submarine technology, cruise missiles and "star wars" (SDI).

The Typhoon Example

The most recent Soviet SSBN, of the Typhoon class, has been stationed at Northern Fleet bases on the Kola peninsula. This is connected with the Typhoon's special properties of operating under the ice in the Arctic Ocean,

for instance, with so-called Ice Pick technology. The development of the Typhoon class has prompted the United States to react openly.

The present head of the U. S. Navy, Adm James Watkins, admitted in May 1983 that the United States has placed greater emphasis on exercises with their attack submarines (SSN) under the Polar ice in order to be able to attack Soviet SSBN (Typhoon).

This in turn forces an increased Soviet concentration of protection of their SSBN. The antisubmarine warfare capability is improved. The coordination between ships, aircraft and C³I plays a major role in this, which in turn increases the value of the northern Norwegian territory for the Soviet Union. In part, there are operational air bases in northern Norway, and in part the Soviet Union can prevent the United States from obtaining access to C³I installation in northern Norway which might be used for operations against Soviet SSBN.

It might be appropriate to say a few words about U. S. strategy in the Norwegian Sea. In 1981 U. S. Navy Secretary John Lehman presented the controversial concept that NATO's naval forces should be able to go as far up in the Norwegian Sea as possible in order to "confine the Soviet Union to Barents Sea."

The statement was based on the Reagan administration's so-called 600-ship program (with a total of 15 carriers). A precondition for Lehman's vision was that the 600-ship program was implemented.

The statement caused a lot of criticism, however, not only from political circles. Adm James Watkins went against his political superior and said that the U. S. Navy should not enter ocean areas dominated by the Soviets.

Watkins was of the opinion that the most important thing for NATO's naval forces is to protect the sea lines of communication between the United States and Western Europe; operations in the Norwegian Sea come second. The reason for this is the evaluation that the Soviet capacity constitutes too great a risk for the U. S. carriers. They are at the disposal of the chief of the NATO Atlantic command, SACLANT.

Two carrier groups are believed to be sufficient in order to be able to control the Norwegian Sea. But it must be remembered that SACLANT has other defense regions besides the Norwegian Sea, which is why the carriers may be needed in other places in a crisis situation.

How, then, is Watkins's statement to John Lehman to be interpreted in relation to Watkins's statement regarding U. S. SSN exercises in the Arctic Ocean?

Watkins is likely to stick to his position that U. S. carriers should stay away from the Norwegian Sea until NATO has a more adequate force for carrying out barrier operations in the region. On the other hand, it is another matter to conduct SSN operations against Soviet SSBN's.

Cruise Missiles

Cruise missile technology is another field which has bearing on the Nordic security policy. In Sweden, above all, it has been pointed out both officially and unofficially that we must improve our capacity to detect and counter overflying cruise missiles.

U. S. air-launched cruise missiles of the AGM-86B type (about 1,500 operational today, range 2,400 km) increase the Soviet need for advanced air defense on Svalbard, for instance. After all, it is important for the Soviet Union to cut off the approach route for B-52G aircraft before they have reached a launch point, from where AGB-86B can reach targets in the Soviet Union. The measure requires additional aircraft for the air defense region in Archangelsk. This in turn increases Soviet capability for regional air supremacy, since the aircraft of the air defense also have the capability for fight/attack together with the Tactical Air Force. The development of "Stealth" aircraft and the new B-1 B bomber also indicate the Soviet need for advanced air defense, since the U. S. attack routes go over the Arctic.

Sea-launched cruise missiles are another threat which requires greater Soviet defense measures. The U. S. SLCM BGM-109A Tomahawk (range about 2,500 km) on the Los Angeles class submarines exist in both conventional and nuclear versions. In order to reach the Kola peninsula it is necessary to launch north of the GIUK gap, and in order to reach Moscow to launch from a point 700 km from the Soviet coast (or Norwegian coast).

The Soviet Union must invest additionally in antisubmarine capacity in order to be able to meet the threat from ship-based cruise missiles. This increases both the naval equipment in the Norwegian Sea/Barents Sea and the need for Norwegian territory for ship-supported antisubmarine operations.

Furthermore, the cruise missile threat increases the demand for improved air defense in the Leningrad military district with greater preparedness and better capability of surprise attacks as a result.

SDI

The development of a space-based defense against ballistic missiles (SDI = Strategic Defense Initiative) is another factor with significance for Nordic security policy.

The project will probably take a very long time before becoming operational. Some systems are likely to begin to be used before the entire project is developed. After all, the development scarcely runs parallel in the two blocs. Either bloc may achieve supremacy over the other and thus the so-called crisis stability is threatened. If the Soviet Union ends up in a weak position, the importance of the military installations on the Kola peninsula will obviously grow. The Soviets can undertake panic measures in order to reach the open sea, for example, and then the importance of U. S. operations

in the area will increase. This is yet another example of the risk of unintentional escalation.

If the United States develops an effective defense against ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union will be forced to place greater emphasis on its bomber capacity in order to maintain the nuclear balance. Signs of this can already be seen in the efforts on the new intermediate-range Blackjack bomber. It can carry the AS-X-15 cruise missile (range about 3,000 km).

The ship-based SS-NX-21 cruise missile (range about 3,000 km) is another weapon which can avoid the SDI defense because of the missile's low altitude properties. The missile can be placed on board Yankee submarines, among others, which therefore must pass through the Norwegian Sea, the GIUK gap and further out into the Atlantic in order to launch outside the U. S. coast. During the 1960's the Yankee submarine has the same task, but then equipped with SBLM.

The development means that the importance of the Norwegian Sea as a transit area for Yankee submarines increases, but also that the value of air bases on the Kola peninsula for basing or fuelling/loading the bombers will grow. This requires additional defense measures and greater preparedness with the resulting negative effects for Nordic security policy.

How Will the Soviet Union React if Norway Accepts SDI Bases?

Another aspect of the U. S. SDI program is the role Norway as an alliance partner is expected to or will play. A recently submitted report regarding technological and scientific sides of the SDI program affects the issue of Norway's participation in the program. The report, written by employees of the Norwegian Defense Research Institute, points out that Norway as an industrial nation must keep in step with other countries developing SDI technology.

The researchers see a possibility for Norwegian technological development if one participates in the SDI program. The report, which was submitted to Prime Minister Willoch in June 1985, is of a purely technical and scientific nature. No political considerations have been made.

The strong wish to participate in the SDI program or to share in research results from it, may place Norway in a security-politically sensitive situation. The risk of pressure from the Soviet Union is obvious. How will the Soviet Union react if SDI-related installations are placed on Norwegian territory?

How should Norway react if the Soviet Union were to expand its early warning capacity on Svalbard, in order as early as possible to detect and block U. S. bomber routes over the Arctic Ocean?

Conclusion

The list of examples of technological changes could be made much longer. I have not for example touched on the modernization of the helicopter, landing, armored and artillery units in that part of the Soviet Union which borders on the Nordic region. However, the examples given should illustrate clearly enough what security policy problems the development of military technology represents for us Nordic residents.

The Kola peninsula is a piece of land which is increasing in strategic importance in the global competition between the superpowers. Accordingly, whoever possesses this valuable region concentrates on defending it. The defense measures can relatively easily also be used for offensive purposes (or in pure "power projection") against the neighbors--that is to say the Nordic countries. Theoretically, we ourselves (the Nordic countries) can balance the offensive capability by investing in improved defensive capability. This is one side of the coin.

On the other side of the same coin we are helpless spectators, however: this concerns the risk of unintentional escalation. Since the Kola peninsula is the valuable piece of land it is, it naturally attracts the interest of the other superpower. It is in the latter's interest that all that is valuable up here will not be used. What is regarded by one side as a defensive act is regarded by the other side as a purely offensive act and then the escalation is dangerously close. Seen from a military point of view we cannot compensate for the threat (that would even accelerate the escalation process), but we have only political means to resort to. This is why we place so much value on confidence-creating measures, which all very well and good. There is, however, a danger in blind belief in a nuclear-free zone, for example.

Much is at stake in a global perspective for both superpowers with all that is valuable in the Norwegian Sea/Barents Sea and in adjoining coastal nations. This is why it appears impossible that the United States, for instance, would refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into the Norwegian Sea, or even into Norway, in a crisis situation. It can surely also be motivated to use the weapons in a situation where, as one sees it, one is forced to do so.

Some concluding words about security policy consequences for Norway and Sweden.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for Norway to carry out the delicate balancing act of "deterrence-reassurance." Due to the widened gap between the structural goals of the defense and the defense budget, the Norwegian defense is losing more and more of its deterrent capability.

At the same time Norway's capability to "reassure"--that is to say to assure the rest of the world regarding the clearly defensive orientation of its defense measures--is diminishing, because the threat picture causes Norway to have to invest more in order to secure allied reinforcements in time. Not only aircraft to COB airfields should be in place within 48 hours, but naval

and ground forces as well, preferably sooner. This poses further demands on preparations for rapid and secure reception of the reinforcements, as well as political decisions to ask for reinforcements in time.

How likely is this? The ability to make political decisions in time is hampered by the problem of interpreting intelligence as well as the opponent's increased opportunities for surprise. How far can Norway go in relaxing the base and nuclear arms restrictions before it becomes politically untenable, not only for Norway but for the entire Nordic stabilization pattern?

The Norwegian dilemma is just as much a Swedish one. The earlier allied reinforcements arrive in Norway, the more important it is for the Soviet Union to prevent these reinforcements from arriving. Furthermore, there are a number of other reasons for the Soviet Union to dominate or neutralize Norwegian territory, reasons which this essay has already touched upon. The risk of operations on and over Swedish territory is therefore that much greater. It poses major demands on our C³I capacity and our air defense. But we have also entered a phase in which the gap between structure and allocated resources for the defense has widened. For us, as well as for the Norwegians, it is important to have political decisions in time. We even have the defense minister's word for that.

Unlike Norway, we have no opportunities to ask for allied reinforcements, and we also should not have any, if we are the least concerned about Nordic stability.

Unlike Norway, however, Sweden has the opportunity to increase its defense efforts without having to "reassure" the rest of the world that what we are doing is purely defensive. If, for example, we invest in an improved air defense and C³I capacity, this is something which not only Norway but even the Soviet Union can benefit from.

Our neutrality policy dictates that we must be able to rebuff violations and threats no matter where they come from. From this it follows that the Soviet Union must greet an expansion of our air defense with satisfaction, since we improve the chances of halting for instance cruise missiles intended for targets to the east. The fact that this same Swedish armament benefits Norway's security-policy situation as well is a reinforcement of the Nordic stability pattern, and no one could reasonably have any objection to that.

Pluses, Minuses of Southern Norway Attack Scenario

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[Article by Bo Hugemark]

[Text] Sweden can be neutral in war if the major powers regard refraining from attack as the favorable alternative. The reason is among other things the submarine violation, which are considered to have demonstrated that the

value of Swedish territory has increased. The "benefit" of subjugating Sweden would therefore exceed the "cost." The Soviet Union would evaluate an attack as "profitable."

The purpose of this essay is not to evaluate in absolute terms the probability of such statements. It is more modest; namely, to inventory which factors might be important in this "cost-benefit calculation." In so doing I assume that the "benefit side," that is to say the motives for an attack in Scandinavia, has been discussed by other lecturers/authors. I am satisfied with making certain assumptions regarding strategic Soviet targets in a hypothetical war. Principal importance is placed on examining various means to achieve these goals: Are the costs acceptable or so great that an attack is unprofitable? Is it possible to find methods which are cheaper than the traditional ones?

Preconditions

The discussion begins with a situation in which the Soviet Union evaluates an outbreak of war between East and West as imminent. The effort is to keep the war at a conventional level as long as possible. It is judged that the connection across the Atlantic will acquire decisive importance in some conceivable courses of events. Since it is very difficult to foresee which development will actually take place (due, among other things, to uncertainty about nuclear escalation), the Soviet Union wants to guard itself by taking the initiative from the outset in a battle of the North Atlantic. To this end it is necessary immediately to render it impossible for NATO to use the southern Norwegian air bases and subsequently take them for its own use.

Such operations are carried out under tight pressure of time. If the objectives are not achieved sufficiently quickly, there is risk that NATO will have time to reinforce the defense of Norway, that NATO irretrievably will take the initiative in the Atlantic war or that important transports have time to cross the Atlantic before the Soviet Union has had time to seriously threaten the sea lanes.

No exact time requirements can be formulated; it is a matter of very complicated connections which vary according to the exact course of events.

Roughly, it may be said that from the very first day of the war it is necessary to prevent reinforcement transports to Norway, and it is desirable within 1-2 weeks to be able to provide advanced bases for Soviet aircraft. The longer it takes for the latter, the more difficult it will be to take the initiative in the battle for the Atlantic and the more convoys will have time to cross. In theory it can be calculated that the U. S. standing forces will have been shipped over one month after a decision. This does not mean that the "race is over," however. In a longer conflict, regardless of whether it involves drawn-out acts of war in Central Europe or a stalemate and attempts to bring about a decision through indirect strategy it might be essential to prevent the transfer of reserves, replacement materiel, military maintenance or civilian supplies from the United States.

Various possibilities may be envisioned for the Soviets to achieve these goals. However, all alternatives would need to be preceded by massive fighting against for instance southern Norwegian air bases, carriers in the Norwegian Sea and potential NATO reinforcement transports en route to Norway. In this connection it is likely that Swedish territory must be used to such an extent that it is not a matter of neutrality violations but of acts of war. After the initial blows, aerial combat must take place continuously during a long period.

After or in connection with such combat occupation of the air bases in southern Norway could theoretically take place in the following manner:

- (1) parachute landings through Swedish territory.
- (2) by parachute landings and/or disembarkations directly against the target but avoiding Swedish territory. One possibility is operations through the Baltic outlets along the lines of Hitler's "Weseruebung" on 9 April, another is operations originating from the Kola peninsula.
- (3) by invasion from/through Danish territory, after occupation of it.
- (4) by invasion from/through Swedish territory after occupation of it.

I will here analyze mostly alternative (4) which is a traditional Swedish "attack scenario." After that I will deal more briefly with the others for comparison. It is already possible to determine, however, that (1), (2) and (3) are very sensitive operations, which involve taking considerable risks of total failure. In addition, (3) would be extremely time-consuming; Denmark could scarcely be occupied in less than 2-3 weeks.

Evaluation Method

In our defense planning it is common in analyses of this kind to work with the following "cost classifications:"

- The deployment of forces needed for a successful operation.
- Losses over the course of the operation.
- Time for accomplishment of the operation.
- The risk of failure.

Usually the concept of constraints is used, that is to say the circumstance that forces cannot be used in other directions during a certain period. But this lies so close to deployment (if viewed in a dynamic perspective) that it is unnecessary to differentiate between these two concepts.

A number of complicated interrelationships exist between the cost classifications. A large deployment could reduce time consumption and risk of failure. It could mean increased losses of vital resources, or reduced such losses if the result is a rapid breakthrough. The individual cost classifications are in themselves very complex. The deployment breaks down into various kinds of materiel and forces more or less exclusive and valuable. The importance of time depends on what kind of counterattacks the enemy might undertake. The size of the risk and the inclination of the attacker to take it are factors that are very difficult to evaluate. It may be added that it is also very dangerous to try to evaluate how the benefit is valued and that it could be debatable what is benefit and what is cost. (Should, for example, a late occupation of the final target be expressed as reduced benefit or high time cost?)

The outcome of all of these complications is that it is impossible to expect to be able to evaluate different alternatives in exact measures or even particularly systematically. A systematization essentially fulfills the need for being a check list that the alternatives have been evaluated more or less fairly. In order to become comprehensible the evaluation must be expressed verbally in relatively brief terms. In so doing one runs the risk instead of ending up in overly specific scenarios and drawing overly general conclusions from them. It is difficult to keep the course clear of both the Scylla of abstraction and the Charybdis of concretion.

Major Attacks

In defense planning we generally distinguish between two kinds of invasion, major attacks and surprise attacks. The difference relates to our preparedness level; major attacks are against a Swedish defense which has undertaken extensive mobilization measures, while surprise attacks mean that these have not taken place. The definitions are not quite crystal clear and are to some extent circular reasoning, which leads to a lack of clarity of the borders between the forms of invasion. This has less significance in the present discussion, however, where the nature of the attack is evident from the actual description.

We anticipate that a major attack must be opened with an extensive aerial attack on the Swedish defenses against invasion in order to make us "ripe for storming." The attacker must knock out the main portion of the military forces which might operate while he is shipping across outside the skerries and which could be flexibly deployed in various areas (attack aircraft, submarines, surface attack ships). He must clear the way through minefields against the intended landing beaches, overcome the coast artillery which defends inlets and beaches and see to it that the beach defense on the whole is knocked out. Stronger reserves of armored units, for example, must also be prevented from intervening in the sensitive first hours of a landing.

The combat described above takes place primarily with attack and bomber aircraft. Particularly in the final phase it can be supplemented with airborne landings, deployment of sabotage units, etc. A precondition for

aerial combat and airborne landings is that the Swedish fighter aircraft and air defenses have been knocked out or otherwise prevented from operating.

This "preliminary combat," as the abovementioned phase is called, is a complex activity, which is likely to be rather costly. It probably takes at least a week, perhaps two, even if the most recent advances in arms technology are used and even if in advance one refrains from achieving full effect and instead concentrates on protecting the crossing. Considerable aircraft losses are certain to occur through Swedish countermeasures, perhaps one-third of the deployed force. Because of this thinning-out, among other things, it becomes necessary gradually to muster strength for deployment against the future landing area. The resources are not sufficient to fight a large number of beaches, junctions and Army reserves. This concentration of the attack increasingly reveals the intentions of the attacker, which makes its possible for the defender gradually to move his attack reserves against the future landing area. We can receive additional early warning signals by seeing where the attacker sweeps mines and where he undertakes his airborne landings about 24 hours before the landing.

To some extent the attacker may be able to reduce the time expenditure and the revealing effect by temporarily increasing his air force deployment. Air forces are extremely mobile, after all, and he may be able temporarily to rebase aircraft from other sectors to the northern region. In so doing the planning becomes even more complex, however, and it might be difficult for him to predict for instance when the principal opponent's air activity in Central Europe will permit withdrawals.

The traditional image of a coastal invasion is that the attacker obtains a beachhead, fills in with combat forces and finally breaks out in an offensive against the ultimate targets. The beachhead must be relatively easily accessible (not have excessively difficult approach conditions), have beaches which permit the landing of special tonnage and possess harbors with large capacity. Further, terrain and connections on land must be such that they favors combat with mechanized units.

One condition for planning has long been that the attacker can only establish one beachhead, depending on, among other things, limitations involving fighter aircraft, airborne landing troops, transport aircraft, helicopters, minesweepers, landing craft, etc. Since we have long been talking about the fact that the major power has increased his capability for coastal invasion through advances in arms technology and transport technology and new methods for coastal invasion, it might now be time to question this presumption.

Regardless of the number of beachheads, the crossing and landing alone is a dangerous operation. The multitude and variety of Swedish armed forces have the effect that the attacker despite the early combat may suffer losses such that the operation fails. Since in this situation harbors are likely to have been blockaded, the first landing waves must take place with special craft. At present the capacity is at most one regiment at a time, which could be at

least a five-fold inferiority compared to the army reserves that might be deployed by the defender during the first 24 hours.

It is likely to take a number of days before major ports are taken, another few before they have been cleared and repaired, yet another few before sufficiently many divisions have been landed in order to break a defense, which in that situation has been reinforced considerably by concentrating armed forces from parts of the country which are now no longer threatened.

As was mentioned above, the landing requires extensive preliminary combat. If the attacker has overestimated the effect of this, the operation could suffer catastrophic losses during the sensitive crossing. But even if Swedish air, naval and coast artillery forces have been 100 percent overcome, there is always risk that the principal opponent deploys attack aircraft at a decisive moment. Deadly threats can be aimed against the landing fleet from bases in Central Europe, Norway or carriers in the Norwegian Sea. In order to prevent this, major coordinated air operations are required against NATO aircraft over a long period.

Besides time expenditure and risk of failure, the landing phase could also result in losses of vital resources of the abovementioned kind. Losses of aircraft and airborne landing resources could become serious in the continued operation in all directions, losses of landing tonnage and minesweepers become felt if the Soviet Union intends to occupy Denmark at a latter stage in order to open the Baltic outlets.

If the attack nevertheless succeeds in shipping across, landing, establishing the beachhead, charge up and break out, extensive operations lie ahead before the ultimate target is reached. His losses during these and the time it takes are difficult to estimate. They depend on, among other things, what armed forces we have left, whether the attacker succeeds in limiting our mobility and NATO's capabilities for counterattacking. The attacker strives to take the largest areas possible, to tie down our forces by crossing the land border in the north, by aerial combat, parachute landings and diversionary operations, as well as by moving up his own aircraft as soon as possible to Swedish bases. Even if the operation to this extent proceeds according to plan, it is likely to take several weeks before a decisive attack could be aimed against the ultimate targets. During this entire period the invasion forces are dependent on largely undisturbed communications at sea.

The latter applies to NATO as well if one wants to reinforce southern Norway by sea. The air supremacy over the Atlantic and Baltic coasts is thus of decisive importance. Here the Western side is in a more favorable situation since from the beginning it has air bases on the Scandinavian peninsula at its disposal. In order to turn this situation around the Soviet Union must not only occupy them but also put them in shape (the Swedish defense has extensive plans for blockading) and group its own resources. If NATO during the outbreak of war begins to prepare its reinforcements and succeeds in keeping the North Sea sufficiently clear of Soviet submarines, the reinforcement transports could be completed before Soviet aircraft can operate from bases in

Sweden, perhaps while NATO aircraft and Swedish aircraft still offer good protection against airborne operations from the Baltic countries.

The described operation implies that the Soviet Union as quickly as possible advances toward its ultimate targets in Norway. This must take place at the cost of leaving large portions of Swedish territory untouched for a long time. This gives the West opportunities to utilize Swedish territory for its purposes. If operations are under way simultaneously in Central Europe, NATO has major aerial operational advantages to gain from being able to overfly Swedish territory against targets in Eastern Europe, communications nodes, reserves, maintenance transports etc. Other aerial routes sensitive to the East lead toward sea transports along the Baltic coast, naval bases in the Baltic region or the shipyards in Leningrad or strategic targets in the interior of the Soviet Union. The disadvantages would become even greater if NATO could operate from Swedish bases. Without speculating too much over what decisions a Swedish government would take when the neutrality policy has failed, it is nevertheless possible to state that the attacker will hopefully consider that he has much to lose from violating our neutrality.

The early introductory air attacks, which it is assumed that the Soviet Union will aim toward NATO bases in southern Norway, represent the starting shot for an embittered fight for sea supremacy in the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. In all probability NATO will thereby take the offensive. At the same time as a hunt for Soviet submarines will begin, air attacks will be aimed against Soviet surface forces, air bases etc. The defense of northern Norway will be reinforced. The outcome of this trial of strength is difficult to predict, but the Soviet Union runs a certain amount of risk that if and when they succeed in conquering the southern Norwegian bases and move up their own aircraft there, NATO will have achieved such successes in the naval war and undertaken such countermeasures that the gain from the Scandinavian operation will be an illusion.

Even if the East will ultimately succeed in establishing "sea denial" for the Atlantic sea lanes, the value of this is likely to be lower the more time has passed and the more vital transports have already been completed.

In conclusion may be stated the following about the profitability of the major attack:

The advantage for the attacker of undertaking a major attack is that he can minimize the risk of major losses or failure due to the effect of the Swedish armed forces. After all, the long preliminary combat is aimed at making Sweden "ripe for storming." If this does not take place at the established time, it is probably possible to postpone landing for the required number of days. The big problem is, however, that the preliminary fighting against Sweden does not prevent NATO aircraft from intervening from bases in the vicinity of Sweden. The long time required for a major attack also gives NATO the opportunity to have time to carry out a large number of countermeasures which might result in the ultimate goal not being achieved or being achieved so late that its value is greatly reduced.

It is therefore time to continue and examine if there are methods of attack which could reduce the costs. Closest at hand is to concentrate on surprise. It is possible to outline a relatively conventional surprise attack from the major attack.

Attack With a Surprise Beginning

We begin by reducing the time for preliminary combat by letting it start against Swedish air forces which are not fully mobilized for war. An attack against a completely unprepared air force on a peacetime basis is obviously most favorable. However, this is perhaps an overly optimistic hypothesis (for the attacker). If this hypothesis forms the basis for planning the attack, it means that the attack will fail if Sweden receives the least amount of early warning. Let us assume that the attacker instead presumes that the Swedish Air Force has gone to a higher preparedness level and has switched to wartime bases which do not have full service capacity, however. In this case it would take several hours, perhaps 24 hours, even with massive deployment, before the attacker can take the risk of deploying transport aircraft and landing craft. In this phase Swedish aircraft have not been knocked out for good, but continued extensive combat and protection is necessary for the invasion attempt.

Between the parachute landing forces and forces landing on the beach on the one hand and Swedish strike prevention units on the other there is now a race under way to take ports and airfields, and to defend and blockade them. The outcome is extremely uncertain. If the attacker wins, he could within about 24 hours muster an increase in strength which is considerably larger than in the major attack, as a result of being able to use commercial shipping immediately. This means that one (or more) bridgeheads could be established more rapidly. Contributing to this is also the fact that opposition is weaker, since Swedish ground forces have not had time to deploy, or even mobilize partially. Furthermore, mobilization might be disturbed by the attacker by various means, air attacks, airborne landings, sabotage etc.

This relative weakness in the defender also enables the invader to begin the offensive against the ultimate targets sooner. The Swedish forces are always behind and must improvise defense and counterattack with recently mobilized, untrained forces with major personnel and materiel shortcomings.

This type of invasion should reasonably take considerably less time than a major attack. But it is not possible to avoid the technical timetables for crossing, unloading and advancing with sufficient supplies. Roughly, one could perhaps estimate the time for the entire invasion even against weak opposition as at least a week, during which time NATO quite likely has time to undertake a number of countermeasures.

The price for the high rate of attack is greater risk. The effect of various deployments is uncertain already against the Swedish armed forces. The entire venture must probably take place according to a strictly fixed (and thus

sensitive) plan. If more aircraft survive the brief preliminary combat than anticipated, if raids against some important coast artillery units fail, if the Home Guard succeeds in blockading some important harbors, the plan could come to nothing. If potential NATO contributions are also added in, the venture becomes exceedingly hazardous. It is certainly possible to speculate that NATO will not have time to intervene. But how is the attacker to evaluate this reduced risk for NATO intervention in relation to the greater risk of failure in case the intervention takes place anyhow?

The more rapid course of operation also provides NATO with less time to utilize Swedish territory for attack against the rear parts of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet homeland. However, such interventions cannot be excluded during the week which was assumed above to be the minimum time for occupying Sweden. If the attack takes place simultaneous with major operations under way in Central Europe, the problem recurs of weighing the advantages for the Warsaw Pact and NATO of forcing Sweden into war on the Western side.

Strategic Coup

One way of getting out of this dilemma could be to make the invasion of Sweden even more rapid in such a way that Swedish resistance is completely paralyzed, Swedish territory can be occupied immediately and Soviet aircraft quickly be based far forward. This type of attack—which we may call a strategic coup—requires an entirely different method than those previously outlined. The start must be identical, a paralyzing strike against the Swedish Air Force. After that, operations must follow immediately across the entire surface in order to prevent mobilization as well as to take a large number of points where it is possible to fill in with troops, by air, by sea and across the land border. Our command system is paralyzed through jamming, sabotage, etc. There is a lack of organized resistance and the final occupation can therefore take place with relatively limited forces.

A strategic coup quite likely requires extensive preparations in peacetime. Detailed intelligence must be gathered on the situation in our defense installations. Preparations must be undertaken so that sabotage units can rapidly find the way to objects or persons who are to be destroyed or murdered.

Realization of the coup is a sensitive operation, of course. If the defender's preparedness has been judged incorrectly, it could easily fail. It is likely to require deployment of airborne landing forces on such a scale that it is uncertain whether the resources are sufficient. In this respect it is necessary, however, to make numerous reservations. The vulnerability of society can increase so that evaluations of the necessary deployment of force can change rapidly. The concept of surprise also encompasses the use of new, unexpected methods. The shock effect of a surprise attack would be great, to be sure. There is a tendency in us to underestimate psychological factors, to presume that everything will progress according to plan. The attacker might not need to deploy all of his parachute landing divisions and physically prevent every soldier from mobilizing in order for mobilization to break down;

it may be enough with considerably more modest efforts in order to break the will to resist. The less effort the more concealed the preparations can be made and the less the risk that the Swedes will raise the preparedness level and that NATO will prepare countermeasures. The rapid operation then gives NATO little time to react.

But the fact that the Swedish defense breaks down will not mean that the attacker has reached his strategic objectives. Of course, the air route would be free toward Norway as far as Swedish air defense is concerned, but this would apply to NATO as well toward the east and southeast. It ought to be at least a few days before the Soviets can move up the bases of their own aircraft and prevent NATO from overflying. The next step, the occupation of southern Norway, cannot take place solely by way of aerial landings, since NATO is likely to have raised its state of alert considerably. Hence, the Soviet Union must add reinforcements to Sweden and follow up with a traditional land offensive, something which ought to take at least another week.

Isolated Attack

The fact that Sweden has strategic value for both sides obviously creates a dilemma for the attacker. One way of solving this is by definition an isolated attack. This will be discussed in greater detail by Einar Lyth. I am satisfied to make two statements.

First, the isolated attack is often dismissed with the argument that it provides too little benefit at too great a cost. This evaluation is generally quite arbitrary, however; no systematic comparison with the profitability of other more "politically relevant" cases of attack is made.

Second, it is maintained that: "An armed conflict in the north is therefore scarcely conceivable under otherwise calm and stable conditions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact" (FK [Defense Commission] 85). This is a sham battle. The definition of an isolated attack is not that it is carried out during a complete state of peace but that the principal opponent does not interfere. What should be taken into consideration is whether situation could arise in which the Soviet Union initiates a major war with an attack on Sweden, and NATO takes so long with various countermeasures that the attacker neither needs to maintain a guard in other directions nor risks NATO interference against the invasion of Sweden. In other words, an introductory attack which is regarded as an isolated one by NATO and which is definitely felt as isolated by Sweden.

Goes Directly for the Ultimate Goal

The weakness of all alternatives which imply invasion and occupation of Sweden is that they give NATO time and opportunity to undertake countermeasures. The same disadvantage is inherent in an invasion originating from Danish territory (or through the Baltic outlets after Danish territory has been "neutralized").

It would therefore be more advantageous if an invasion attempt could be undertaken directly against Sweden.

Such an attempt would likely be prefaced with massive air attacks in order to defeat air forces in southern Norway and Denmark.

Aircraft carrier forces in the Norwegian Sea must be eliminated. The strike is immediately followed by airborne and seaborne landings in Norway. Since the landing fleets must come from Murmansk or the Baltic Sea the potential deployment against southern Norway will either be very small or very late (since NATO sounds the alarm if large forces assume positions of attack). The weight of the first wave must therefore lie in parachute landings. Most favorable would be if they could be flown over the shortest route, that is to say over Sweden. This alternative is all the more appealing since Swedish territory must already be violated during the introductory aerial attack.

One precondition for success is obviously that Swedish air forces are prevented from interfering. If this is to be accomplished with military means, the attack must take place as a surprise. A Swedish Air Force which has transferred to wartime bases would inflict decisive losses on the airborne landing attempt.

The Swedish Air Force must be neutralized on a long-term basis. If it is not eliminated entirely at the initial stage, resources must be set aside for continued suppression and combating.

Maintenance and reinforcements must continuously be added to the airborne landing units. It is likely that a sea-land link must be established rather quickly. Again, access to Swedish land territory is required. Another reason for this might be that it excludes the risk of Swedish intervention against the sensitive positions in Norway (a parallel to the German fears after 9 April 1940). The Swedish defense should probably have mobilized by now, and even if the air forces are practically eliminated a time-consuming invasion is impending. In one way the preconditions for this are more favorable than in previous alternatives: NATO's opportunities for intervention. On the other hand, the Soviet Air Force is probably hard pressed from trying to establish air supremacy far from its home bases.

An alternate possibility is to assure the required access to Swedish territory through means other than direct military ones. If Sweden could be induced to regard the first massive overflights as violations of neutrality, not acts of war, if the Swedish contributions could be kept at a low level through appropriate threats and if Sweden, Norway having been occupied, could be induced to regard itself as without a chance, more of the attacking resources could be concentrated to the ultimate goal. This alternative might appear unlikely against the background of our declaration that "Neither fears nor expectations may be created that even under strong external pressure Sweden would abandon its policy of neutrality." It cannot be excluded, however, that our will could be misjudged on the basis of (incorrectly interpreted?) historic experience or the fact that in present-day acute crises we show that

we are afraid to use military means of force. The alternative is so favorable that it would be worth a great deal of effort to try to form a foundation with peacetime political means. Such means could include, among others, propaganda about the horrors of war and about the meaninglessness of armed resistance to a major power. The Swedish people should be convinced that resistance is to play into the hands of the other major power but that help from it cannot be counted on. Gradually stepped-up violations of Swedish territory can be carried out in order to create some form of acclimatization, which makes it easier for Sweden to be able to refrain from regarding violations as acts of war without choosing to continue its "neutrality."

Threats of terror bombing, perhaps with nuclear weapons, can be brought out in acute situations. One way to accomplish this in a more veiled manner would be if a nuclear-free zone could be created with conditions of the sort that freedom from nuclear threats were valid as long as a country did not participate in a war of attack on the side of a nuclear power.

Examination of the Preconditions

The case under discussion implies, as is obvious, a dilemma for the Soviets: almost compelling motives and nearly prohibitive costs for many of the solutions. There is thus reason to go back and scrutinize the strength of the motives. The basic outlines of such an analysis can only be hinted at here.

My fundamental assumptions concerned the concept of a long conventional war, of the importance of the Atlantic connections and of the significance of southern Norway for the Atlantic connections.

The war could, of course, develop so that NATO's conventional defense breaks down rapidly. This could lead to for example nuclear arms escalation, a victory at the negotiating table or a rapid occupation of the European continent. However, none of these alternatives imply that it will suddenly become uninteresting to sever the links between the United States and Europe. Each one contains many conceivable scenarios in which it is important for the Soviet Union, in order to achieve a politically favorable result, to demonstrate to the West that the situation is hopeless, that the experience of two world wars with U. S. rescue operations will not be repeated. Furthermore, as is pointed out in the introduction, in today's strategic situation it is difficult for an attacker to predict the length, geographical extent and level of the war. Assuring control of the Atlantic communications is insurance against unpredictable events.

One might ask, then, whether there are possibly other ways of acquiring this control. If, for instance, Soviet bombers and attack aircraft from bases in Central Europe are able to attack convoys docking at the European coast, entering harbors and unloading, the submarine war would lose in importance. The Soviet Air Force is not likely to possess enough strength yet to play such a role, but this is a development which should be followed carefully.

A third objection might be that the southern Norwegian air bases do not constitute a decisive obstacle to a Soviet submarine war. If the Soviet Union instead could have nuclear-powered submarines in great quantity in the North Atlantic before the outbreak of war, there would not be an equally urgent need for preventing NATO's submarine hunt in the GIUK gap. There is thus reason to follow closely the development of the Soviet peacetime naval dispositions and naval aviation--it is often maintained by NATO that even a Soviet occupation of northern Norway would result in "popping the cork out of the bottle" and a swarm of Backfires would threaten the Atlantic convoys.

Some Concluding Reflections and Conclusions

Under the given preconditions traditional invasions, in particular the major attack, appear rather unlikely. The conclusion cannot be drawn from that that the orientation of our defense efforts is wrong. There are several important reservations:

First, it is largely the circumstance that we have guarded against these events which makes them unlikely.

Second, the above analysis has been aimed at looking at the worst outcome from the Soviet point of view. This includes NATO's countermeasures as a sometimes decisive cost. However, Sweden cannot, while retaining its nonalignment, structure its defense according to presumed help from outside. It is also not possible in a concrete situation to be sure that it would be given. In order to quote the supreme commander's 1957 study: "Valid for all alternatives is that the possibilities for a country such as ours to obtain military assistance from outside in the event of attack is primarily dependent on whether the respective major power regards the aid to be justified in view of the general war situation."

Third, this analysis was undertaken for a rather specific case. The defense planning must be based on a much wider spectrum of conceivable military-political starting points, attackers, strategic targets, restrictions, time conditions etc. A comprehensively structured defense is therefore necessary.

What has been said does not mean that all is well regarding our defensive capability, however. Starting from the discussed situations there is reason to stress a few points where one has to be careful with the development.

--The common denominator for all methods of attack is very large air attacks over and against our territory. The need for a strong fighter defense is obvious.

--Surprise attacks are a more attractive method than a major attack, particularly if they can take place with very little forewarning. The objection that "a bolt from the blue is unlikely" is not convincing. States have often been surprised by bolts from the most threatening sky. An overly sanguine attitude toward surprise in the victim makes it more irresistible to an attacker. It should be pointed out here that the threat of surprise

cannot be taken as a pretext for unilateral concentration of certain types of armed forces. It is necessary both to assure that airborne and naval forces survive the fight and that ground forces can be mobilized and prevent a swift occupation.

--Entirely decisive for whether the attacker is to hold back is his conviction that we will not hesitate to use the armed forces as intended and that he will have to assume all the consequences of violating our neutrality.

Isolated Attack on Sweden

Stockholm INTERNATIONELLA STUDIER in Swedish No 1, 1986 pp 28-35

[Article by Einar Lyth]

[Text] For the security policy studies which in the early 1970's were made the basis for the so-called controlling or dimensioning cases of attack in Swedish defense planning, the government proceeded on the assumption that the resource deployment of a major power during an attack on Sweden would be limited. Only a minor part of his resources would be deployed against Sweden due to the fact that in his planning he would be primarily concerned with a conflict with another major power (the so-called marginal doctrine).

But the government's instructions also include another interesting passage, where it is said that it is impossible to disregard the possibility that at some future time a major power could acquire such freedom of action in Europe that an attack against small nations becomes possible without interference by other major powers. After this statement, however, it says that particularly in similar situations a major power may try to achieve intended advantages with political means, if needed in combination with threats of military reprisals, chiefly the use of nuclear weapons.

These thoughts, reflected in proposition 1972:75, pp 7-9, represent the dominant picture in Swedish defense thinking as a potential victim of invasion only during an armed conflict between the major powers or an immediately impending one. Both the political and the general military objectives are thus assumed to lie outside Sweden. The choice of paths by which to accomplish these objectives by force might affect Sweden.

In its memorandum "Var Sakerhetspolitik" [Our Security Policy] (SOU 1979:42) the 1978 Defense Commission deals with the issue of isolated attack against some part of the Nordic region ("against the most exposed parts of the Nordic region") but not with an attack against Swedish territory alone.

The wording is the following (pp 85-96): "The question is whether any course of events could be conceived causing either superpower to attempt a limited military operation in northern Europe. The object of this would be gaining control of strategically vital positions and making the other superpower face an accomplished fact."

"The step to using military force should have considerable political and military consequences, however. It could lead to strong solidarity and armament within the opposite bloc, regrouping of forces to threatened areas and thus the risk that intended advantages would not be achieved. It also means that a tangible escalation threshold has been passed, with increased risk for continued escalation of the conflict. In a situation resembling that of today, an isolated military operation in Northern Europe could therefore be evaluated as very unlikely. The case cannot be excluded during a change in the military-political situation."

In its report the 1978 Defense Committee skips quickly over the question of isolated attack against Sweden with the following statements:

"... can be assumed that both parties avoid such an operation which it can be feared might jeopardize the most vital interests of the opposite party. Instead, it might be seen as advantageous through rapid and decisive measures to make the opposite party face an accomplished fact. This is why rapid military operations are likely to characterize the initial stage of a war" (p 53).

"... On the other hand, during a confrontation between the power blocs it is conceivable that either party through military operations in limited parts of the European area would pressure the other into political concessions or would secure strategic positions before a feared expansion of the conflict. Such a development could affect our region as well" (p 53).

"... During a growing conflict it can be anticipated that the two power blocs on the one hand try to guard against potential continued escalation by reinforcing defense readiness and training activity. Further, through demonstrative military measures they can mark their decisiveness to safeguard certain interests in ongoing negotiations...." (p 56).

From the context it is apparent that the military measures in all three sections quoted deal with the introductory phase of a major war between the United States/NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact.

There is also the following passage: "An armed conflict in the north is therefore scarcely conceivable under otherwise calm and stable conditions between NATO and the WP" (p 55). The comment could possibly be made that precisely so-called calm and stable conditions--in the opinion of the authors of the report--under certain circumstances could be favorable for one of the parties to dare try an isolated attack.

1. Conclusion

Isolated attacks against small European countries, at least Sweden, have been dismissed as little worthy of attention. This is likely to be associated with three factors: the bipolar situation, the politically and militarily locked-in positions and the balance of terror. All three factors together greatly

limit the freedom of action to achieve changes in power politics and especially to move up the military positions. But are the limitations really of the type that an isolated attack on Sweden can be excluded?

The policy of major powers, seen from a historical perspective, has shown the isolated attack to be the rule rather than the exception. It is sufficient to point out the Italian attack on Ethiopia in 1936 and Albania in 1939, the Soviet attacks on Poland in 1939, Finland 1939, Romania 1940 and the Baltic states in 1940, the German attacks on Austria in 1938, Czechoslovakia in 1939 and Poland in 1939. To be sure, it is possible afterwards to maintain that all of these actions constituted moving up positions before a coming world war, but for the contemporaries--and most likely to the actors themselves--they appeared more as isolated attacks, because all of them were founded on the assumption that no one would come to the aid of the victim and the attack would not trigger a major war.

2. Limitations

The type of isolated attack on Sweden which is discussed in this account is a military operation which is aimed solely against Sweden. The objective of the operation is to achieve occupation of the entire Swedish territory without any other state (third party) intervening militarily against the operation. The objective is intended to be accomplished primarily through invasion.

The fact that with these limitations I exclude threats, terror, etc. as significant means of force is only in order to concentrate the discussion around a few issues which are central to me. This also applies to leaving out isolated attacks against a part of Sweden (such as Gotland) or a part of the Nordic region (such as the Arctic area of the Nordic countries or the Baltic outlets) which include Swedish territory. This does not mean that I regard such objectives and means as less likely.

For reasons of concentration I examine only the Eastern case, that is to say an isolated attack carried out by the Soviet Union/Warsaw pact, started in a military-political situation (pact relationships, strength relationships, military geography) which largely resembles the present one. Other situations and other attackers would also be worth attention.

3. The Purpose of the Isolated Attack

Without having made a complete typology I expect that potential objectives behind an isolated Soviet attack on Sweden could principally be the following ("types of intentions").

1. Operationally conditioned offensive or defensive advancing of positions against NATO before a Soviet (A) feared or (B) planned imminent major war (such as advanced basing, control of airspace, control of the Baltic outlets).
2. A power-politically conditioned conflict measure (countermove) against a previous measure by the United States/NATO (such as in response to NATO's closing an international channel).
3. A security-politically conditioned

moving up of positions in order to counteract an ongoing or feared shift in the power balance to the advantage of NATO (such as loosening pressure in Eastern Europe, Swedish NATO membership, Finnish shift to the right, large-scale offshore oil exploitation in the southern Baltic or in the Arctic area of the Nordic region). 4. A power-politically conditioned unprovoked offensive moving up of positions (such as utilizing a favorable opportunity to increase power and influence, increasing one's own security, demonstrating the vitality of the system, masking weaknesses).

My main interest is tied to the three latter types of intentions, since they have been given the least attention in the debate.

Regarding intention types 2 and 3, it might be said that based on today's political situation a foreplay in the form of increasing tension with strong elements of threat, a shift in the balance or internal conflicts are needed before the Soviet Union would be motivated to start an isolated attack on Sweden. The same need not apply to intention type 4.

My basic assumption for the continued reasoning is that none of gain connected with intention types 2-4 (Sweden as a base, a pawn, compensation, potential) are worth the price of a major war. If the risk is judged great that the United States/NATO would expand the conflict into a major war or undertake measures rapidly judged as leading to a major war, the Soviet Union is assumed to refrain from attacks or in certain situations possibly even to break off an attack in progress.

The entire argument is based on a general assumption that the United States/NATO are interested in preventing the Soviet Union from establishing itself militarily and politically on Swedish territory, and that the United States/NATO in certain situations are prepared to defend this interest with military means--or in other words despite the fact that Sweden is not a member of NATO come to the assistance of the country during attack.

4. The Passivity of a Third Party

If the attack on Sweden is to be kept isolated, it is thus presumed that a third party (USA/NATO) will not intervene with military means in order to prevent invasion and occupation.

Here follows an attempt at a rough systematization of potential causes for such passivity ("typical case").

1. There is no time to intervene, since the attack against Sweden is not judged as threatening vital interests.
2. There is no time to decide (possibly not agree on) whether it is or is not appropriate or possible to intervene.
3. It is not possible to agree on intervention, with the result that intervention by a single state also does not take place.

4. Vital interests are believed threatened, but there is no time to intervene since occupation is rapidly accomplished.
5. Vital interests are believed threatened, but one still does not dare attack because of the risks (the NBC threat, among others).
6. Vital interests are believed threatened but other countermeasures are chosen (more appropriate) than military intervention.
7. One wants to but cannot intervene because the military resources are tied down (war or the threat of war in a different area, low preparedness).
8. One refrains from intervention for internal political reasons (sensitive situations before presidential election etc.)
9. One chooses to utilize Soviet/Warsaw Pact involvement in Sweden in order to move up one's own military positions in another region (Middle East, Persian Gulf, Finnmark/Spitsbergen).

Thus, we find a long list of reasons--most of them situation-dependent--in which it does not appear appropriate or possible for the United States/NATO to intervene in Sweden. None of the reasons can very well be dismissed as unlikely. If this is a correct evaluation the conclusion will be that the Soviet Union should have certain--perhaps even good--possibilities for escaping a U.S./NATO intervention by methodically structuring the attacks in such a way that the likelihood of intervention is minimized. The conclusion is that an isolated attack on Sweden under certain not overly far-fetched preconditions may be--or at least to the Soviet Union may appear to be--feasible.

5. Organizing the Attack

To avoid intervention.

More alternative courses of action can be construed in order to maximize the probability that the United States/NATO will not intervene. In order not to complicate the representation unnecessarily, it is possible to begin with a few essential features which all originate from the abovementioned type cases, namely: (the type cases in parentheses)

- the attack should not (immediately) threaten (be perceived as threatening) U. S. (NATO's, important NATO states') vital interests
- the attack should rapidly lead to the objective
- the attack should be structured so that it evokes different reactions in different NATO countries and in different domestic political factions (divide the front with threats and promises or in other ways)

- NBC threat can be utilized; (employment doubtful, however)
- prospects are made for negotiations and concessions
- current situations of weakness in the opponent are utilized, if possible
- U. S./NATO intervention will appear too risky to (parts of) NATO

Among these factors speed is obviously one of the most important. Early discovery of preparations for attack and slowly undertaken operations (occupation) with long remaining pockets of resistance allow time for decisionmaking and countermeasures and cause optimism and energy on the Western side. It is therefore most essential for the attacker that the attack comes as a surprise and very rapidly leads to the objectives.

Exceptions to this main principle might possibly be under special conditions (for example that NATO is already seriously divided or heavily engaged in another direction).

To continue, I assume an attack which is planned so that beginning with the discovery of preparations and intentions with sufficient certainty it will be able to lead to the objective in days or at most a few weeks. In the present Swedish armament situation it consequently takes a strategic coup (surprise attack simultaneously across large parts of the surface) or a surprise attack organized so that in-depth targets and gateways from the West can be taken or controlled early on. Such a degree of surprise and such a rapid course of invasion ought to presume that Swedish aircraft and coast artillery are knocked out early on by sabotage units, gas, remote mining or with other less common methods. Mobilization should be disturbed (including major cities, sabotage) and the destruction of Swedish communications should be limited. This requires the deployment of special units, special means of transportation and the most advanced resources in general. A great deal of personnel is needed, but they do not necessarily have to be heavily armed, particularly if the intention is to break the will to resist rather than the capability to resist.

Other type case-derived features concern the framework around the attack. It is obvious that if the attack is to be perceived as not threatening vital interests, it must not be felt as the introductory phase of an imminent major war. Dispersal, deployment and high mobilization along other fronts and at strategic forces should therefore be avoided. On the contrary; it is appropriate to have demonstrative thinning out and low mobilization. To be sure, this involves the risk of counterattacks by NATO on these other fronts. The likelihood that NATO would go to a counteroffensive, especially before a concentration etc. has had time to take place, ought to be negligible, however. A thinning out in secondary directions before or during the attack furthermore serves the purpose of concentrating all advanced means of combat against Sweden, which provides opportunities for achieving secure and rapid

results. If this reasoning is correct, the marginal doctrine is thus eliminated.

The image of an attack target limited to Sweden can be further substantiated by openly and forcefully declared limited intentions at the outbreak of war, perhaps even supplemented with offers to accept observation groups or similar from the West.

Some countries should be exposed to threats or promises for the purpose of division. For example, one can threaten to expose Copenhagen to nuclear weapons--or gas attacks--and Norway to blockade if the countries "increase the risks of war" by abandoning their peacetime basing and nuclear arms policies.

Another divisive measure may be in connection with the attack to accuse Sweden of injudicious actions (secret aggressive agreements with the United States, unfulfilled secret promises to the Soviet Union or similar). With such allegations it is also possible to make attempts to give the attack a certain apparent legitimacy with respect to the home front and sympathizers abroad. Division can also be facilitated by prospects of armistice talks and subsequently retreat. The crisis situation in question must determine the content of the messages which intend to create the division.

Warning must be expressed that NATO intervention--perhaps even a higher state of emergency, transports etc--will imply an escalation which jeopardizes world peace and makes a negotiated solution impossible or something of the sort. It could be combined with statements about the obvious measures to prevent a major war (reduced state of emergency, thinning out) which the Soviet Union has unilaterally undertaken on other fronts.

The thinning out on other fronts in order to achieve a concentration of strength against Sweden could suitably take place before the attack in the form of major Warsaw Pact maneuvers in the Baltic region. Such an exercise allows for surprise attacks from an exercise grouping.

None of these measures is particularly original. They have all been used in modern military history. Taken together they are feasible and are likely to reduce the probability that the United States/NATO will intervene. The probability of this is further reduced if the attack also comes as a mental surprise to decisionmakers within NATO.

Characteristics

On the part of Sweden this would thus lead to an attack scenario, which on several essential points differs from other types of surprise attacks, primarily in the following respects:

- The attacker desires extreme surprise and an extremely brief course of operation.

- The preparations are likely to include a major exercise designed to conceal the intent to attack.
- The attacker's resources can be concentrated in a more pronounced manner against Sweden.
- From the outset the invasion is aimed at important partial targets across the entire surface.
- Swedish weapon systems which could conceivably prevent initial deployment across the entire area or delay the benefit of invasion must be prevented by means of unconventional methods from having an impact.

Here I will briefly supplement these characteristics on a few points in order to make the image more concrete.

Concentration of Power

Since the attacker must build upon surprise, the concentration of power cannot be pushed beyond the limit imposed by the risk of previous Swedish increases in the level of alertness. One is therefore relegated to the forces which exist in or near the operational area in a normal case in peacetime, as well as those which can be added for the major exercise and other forces which after the regrouping have time to be deployed before the end of the operation, that is to say primarily aircraft and airborne landing units or other airborne resources. This limitation should nevertheless allow the most advanced resources available for a highly mobile and different operation to be concentrated to the area before or immediately after the outbreak of war.

The most difficult thing is likely to be to add a sufficient number of tank and infantry divisions as well as the required crossing tonnage without bringing about increases in the Swedish state of alertness. The accessible and transportable divisions must therefore be reserved for solving the tasks which cannot be solved with other resources. Other means and methods must be used.

The Entire Surface

To the forces deployed against the farthest partial targets an initial deployment across the entire area (strategic coup) or across the entire depth of the various invasion directions means great vulnerability. Greater demands for endurance are placed on them. Furthermore, the demands for means of transportation become great. Even with good preparations there are major risks of failure here, which can be exploited by NATO during a potential intervention. Dispersal of the units also involves risks of having them isolatedly beaten. To refrain from dispersal and deployment in depth would be to assume even greater risks, however.

The problems of a concentration of strength by army divisions and initial deployment across the entire area must be solved, since the time demands are unconditional, by trying unconventional means and methods.

Unconventional Methods:

For Reasons of Military Economy

Even the superpowers have limited access to advanced weapon systems and are forced during planning to have to set rigid priorities and budget the resources well. A surprise attack with exacting demands for rapid achievement of the ultimate objectives poses great demands for efficient fighting, especially at the initial stage. Since the performance data of the weapon systems and the type, number and difficulty of the objectives are largely known, it is rather easy to figure out that this fighting is the Achilles heel of the operation.

For example, knocking out a bridge with a high degree of reliability requires quite a lot of aircraft missions and for these aircraft there are several alternative areas of use. One of the questions nearest at hand will then be whether the bridge can be eliminated with greater assurance and/or cheaper in other ways. A group of saboteurs is often both a cheaper and a more efficient solution, in particular if the group can prepare on the spot even in peacetime and if the bridge destruction can take place anonymously even in the hours before an outbreak of war.

This reasoning obviously does not apply merely to communications but also to command systems, war materiel and supplies. Today it is poor military economy and unnecessary loss of time to use aircraft, missiles, warships etc. for missions which can be solved by saboteurs. During an isolated surprise attack against Sweden it is rational to maximize the use of sabotage units.

For Reasons of Time

Another Achilles heel is transportation of troops across the sea by ship or aircraft. It is extraordinarily vulnerable and is considered to require air and sea supremacy. Disembarking from commercial shipping can be subject to delays both on the part of the defender (firing, mines, harbor blockades) and for technical reasons (breakdowns and other difficulties). The Swedish weapon systems, which must be prevented from being deployed against the sea transports, are above all fighter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, which must be greatly reduced. Knocking out these Swedish resources normally requires major efforts over a long period (so-called preliminary combat). The combat result and time requirement cannot be guaranteed in advance. It depends on the weather, among other things.

The attacker must therefore find other solutions. Gas warfare, radioactive fallout etc. might be a solution. The simplest solution is probably massive sabotage deployment in combination with brief intense combat, which with the required degree of speed and reliability knocks out, ties down or temporarily

neutralizes Swedish aircraft and other priority targets during the day or days of the decisive initial stage.

For Reasons of Transportation

Another weak sector is the limited availability of means of transportation. The availability of troops and units is much greater than the availability of transport aircraft, helicopters, Hovercraft, special tonnage etc. This concentration of transport tonnage is believed to be one of the most important early warnings one can get about an imminent invasion. Some of these weaknesses can be remedied by attacking from maneuver formations. The agglomeration of means of transportation are then assumed by the opposite party to be due to the exercise and not to other intentions. No significant increase in readiness is therefore likely to be undertaken in Sweden.

Invasion forces without heavy equipment can rapidly and secretly be taken on board commercial ships, fishing boats, river craft and warships. Helicopters can possibly approach from ships or refuel on ships during the return trip and thus have an extended range. Every method has been used before. Placed in a system, to the invading forces they imply high initial capacity but limited fire power, tactical mobility and endurance. Consequently, the attack presumes such large initial successes and such great shock effect that resistance is abandoned early on in the certain belief that it is not worth it. Actually, this is not very original. On the tactical level all attack-type behavior is more or less based on this effect.

Supplementary Characteristics

In conclusion, this means that the probable characteristics of the attack scenario may be supplemented as follows:

- Air and sea supremacy is accomplished through massive deployment of sabotage units in combination with brief massive conventional fighting, perhaps with elements of N, B or C warfare. The preliminary combat is made brief, perhaps shorter than 12 hours.
- The invasion forces consist principally of lightly equipped troops (500 transport aircraft carry either 1/2-2/3 airborne landing division or 5,000 heavily armed men or 45,000 men with nothing but hand-carried equipment.) For this reason even lighter tonnage can be used.
- The aircraft are based on the well-founded hope that the operation will culminate before the endurance crisis becomes acute.

This attack scenario is finally characterized by the fact that the time frame constitutes the starting point for the planning of the operation. Instead of as usual starting with the targets and the opponents and varying the deployment of force, operational directions and methods and letting time be the regulator, the requirements of time are probably governing in this instance. Since the deployment of advanced systems must be maximized and thus

in principle is given, it is the operational directions, partial targets and methods which can be varied. The planning ends with the answer to the question: Can the attack be carried out within the time frame with a sufficient degree of certainty? If the answer is no, one should probably abstain, because increasing the time means that the certainty is reduced in an unacceptable manner. This provides important starting points for defense against isolated attacks.

6. The Opportunities of the Swedish Defense

It has possibly been understood that the general validity of the so-called marginal doctrine is a precondition for rationality in the Swedish defense efforts. In that case I want to assert another opinion. The exceptionally high demands for time which are probably imposed on most variants of isolated attack on Sweden make the operation risky. How risky, depends both on the initial effect/endurance of the Swedish defense and on the willingness and capability for intervention by the United States/NATO.

The fact that this willingness and capability has a pronounced correlation with the U. S./NATO evaluation of the Swedish defense, in particular its endurance, was illuminated earlier. The greater the Swedish endurance, the greater the possibilities for the United States/NATO to intervene. The preconditions for resistance/endurance are also different from the other attack scenarios, however. Slow and disturbed Swedish growth in strength by units mobilized across the surface must be weighed against fierce initial fighting across the surface initiated by the attack with a greater variation of unit types, above of light ones, most of them with reduced mobility, protection and fire power and with rapidly culminating supply crises.

In many cases what becomes decisive is the time when the decision for increasing the level of Swedish preparedness is taken. This applies partly to measures for increasing mobilization readiness (such as rebuilding materiel) and mobilization reliability (among other things distributing materiel), and partly to decisions (perhaps emergency alarms) for partial mobilization and wartime organization. Measures for creating peace-keeping effects even against this case of attack require a higher and more flexible mobilization readiness and deployment readiness. Among other things, the attacker should be kept uncertain of what Swedish state of emergency he has to reckon with.

Routine increases in emergency readiness during crises and maneuvers by major powers are an important measure. There might be reason to remind people that --on the part of the Swedish Army--increases in emergency readiness to a level corresponding with routine readiness in Denmark, Norway and Finland would mean both conspicuous and expensive measures, difficult to administer. Here changes are needed. It must become more common, easier and cheaper--in short routine--to adjust the readiness to the activity in the surrounding region. The time is past when people in the government and the Army can sit back and relax with the argument that readiness and strength in the Air Force and Navy provide breathing room for decisions and measures in all situations.

There may, furthermore, be reason to examine whether defense structures other than our present one could provide better opportunities for coping with an isolated surprise attack. Maybe it would be wise in so doing to proceed from the assumption that the first round will be lost by the defender. What should the defending force look like, which is to have an opportunity to survive the initial phase in sufficient strength and thereby be able to provide a peace-keeping effect?

7. The Risk of Isolated Attack

In the introduction it was determined that an isolated attack on Sweden is largely regarded as so improbable that it has not been considered worthy of any kind of attention whatsoever in Swedish defense planning. To the extent that such an attack has been discussed at all, it touched on a preparatory operation before a major war. All other forms have been referred to a future Europe, in which conditions have changed so that the political and military freedom of action has become greater.

Against the background of the circumstances reported above, I am of a different opinion. I do not want to say whether conditions in the 1960's and 1970's justified the dismissal of the isolated attack. Regardless of which, the development has caused it to be time to revise official opinion on this point. Sweden is one of the few countries in Europe which the Soviet Union can attack without any immediate risk of nuclear war. Finland and Austria are in the same situation. Of these countries Swedish territory has the highest value to the Soviet Union. When construing threat pictures, conflict scenarios and attack cases today it is usual in Western Europe to start with the objective of the attack or with the ultimate goal of the operation. From these are then derived the means and methods. By so doing we have had to endure a multitude of conflict scenarios, in which targets assumed to be desired by the Soviet Union (such as the English Channel and the beaches of the Bay of Biscay) are reasonable, but means and methods (conventional major attack through the FRG) are of little expediency, not to say useless.

If instead we start with the military means and methods which--at least in certain cases--are useful and from them deduce what targets may be possible, we arrive at different types of conflict scenarios. We then find--perhaps to our horror--that an isolated Soviet attack against our country no longer appears as a case of attack to be ignored for the time being.

During the period of detente in the 1970's and afterwards the development has taken a course which should make isolated attacks on Sweden more current in the defense planning. The foremost reasons for this are

- that the security policy interest of the superpowers in the Nordic region has increased,
- that nuclear deployment at the initial stage of a major war has become less likely,

- that the ambitions and military capacity of the Soviet Union stretches farther west into the North Atlantic,
- that the technical resources for shipping over, air-landing and fighting from the air have increased,
- that the Swedish defense has become weaker in relation to the resources of the surrounding region,
- that the Swedish society and defenses have become more vulnerable to attack, particularly sabotage.

Possibly also that the isolated attack on Afghanistan in 1979 was accomplished and has been possible to isolate up to now.

Just how the stepped-up and potentially also more important Eastern intelligence activity against Sweden and the activities of a war-preparatory nature which have been ascertained along the coast and against our air bases are to be weighed in this context I leave to others to evaluate, however. The "extra arguments" are needed in order for us to realize that it is time to revise our fundamental view of the threat picture. In this context I want to emphasize that here I have touched only on a few types of isolated attacks. Other types as well are worth more attention. This concerns for instance isolated attack against Sweden as a preparatory operation before a major war, isolated attack with terror or the threat of terror as the foremost method of repression. This also applies to the risks of isolated attacks from the West and in altered military political situations. In conclusion I maintain that an isolated attack on Sweden is one of the few military operations in Europe which in today's security policy situation could possibly appear rational.

8. What Happens Afterward?

If we assume that the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact succeeds in carrying out an isolated attack on Sweden mainly for the purpose of countering a feared shift in the power balance (intention type 3) or as an unprovoked moving up of positions (intention type 4), this means that Finland's dependence will increase dramatically. In all likelihood the country will rapidly fall under complete Soviet control. The Baltic Sea will become a Soviet inland sea and the Soviet Union will be a beachowner on the North Sea, where in the long run it has the chance to become the strongest naval power. The political pressure on Norway and Denmark will become great. These nations can choose between a course of adjustment and a course of confrontation, the latter most likely meaning abandoning the present base and nuclear policy. Regardless of the choice of paths the independence of the two countries will be undermined. A glance at the map is enough to determine for example that the strip of coast north of Trondheim cannot be defended either with military or with other means. It is probable that the Soviet Union with subversive and other means sooner or later will be able to transform Denmark and Norway into satellite nations. If this is correct, it is also correct that the situation of England and Western Europe will be fundamentally altered.

There is no major reason to carry the speculations any further, but it is here necessary to go back to the U. S./NATO tendency to intervene in order to prevent an isolated attack on Sweden. The conclusion ought to be that intervention in such a situation is necessary even at the cost of a major war and despite the fact that Sweden is not a member of NATO.

Against the previously reported background it is further possible to maintain that a massive and early military effort by the United States/NATO is necessary. Moreover, only an early effort can contribute to increase Swedish endurance. How is this to be accomplished? The time conditions which were discussed, in combination with basing opportunities and military geography, indicate that only the deployment of aircraft or nuclear weapons can provide results in time. An airborne effort must take place through or in Swedish airspace. This in turn focuses the spotlight on the Swedish security policy (or after the outbreak of war perhaps "military policy") in such a situation. If an isolated attack on Sweden were to become reality--what immediate decisions would a Swedish government then be faced with?

Well, then: If the United States/NATO must intervene in their own interest, then it must be that an isolated attack, despite what was said before, is not practically feasible, mustn't it? If Sweden is attacked NATO has to intervene, otherwise it will be digging its own grave. Therefore an isolated attack against Sweden is not feasible.

My answer is that NATO is probably not capable of making such a different and fateful decision so quickly--and they are able to figure that out in Moscow as well.

Am I right?

11949

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MILITARY

DENMARK

OFFICER DRAIN SEEN SPREADING FROM AIR FORCE TO ALL SERVICES

Officers Association Issues Warning

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 21 Feb 86 p 5

[Article by Peter Bergen]

[Text] Copenhagen--"If the Defense Ministry continues to ignore the pilot problem, there will soon be a terrible shortage of qualified officers in all areas."

This was stated by Commander Per Moller, member of the Executive Committee of the Central Organization of Officers (HOA).

Last year there was a threefold jump in the loss of officers, who found better jobs in private business and the rush to the exit continues. Changing jobs gives officers better wages, often resulting in an increase of 50 percent or more. This does not include the fringe benefits that often accompany a job in management. In addition, the ex-officers no longer need to move as frequently.

Growing Discontent

"The low wages are bearable, if you like your job," Per Moller said. "But conditions in the military are such that there is growing discontent. More and more officers are becoming dissatisfied and are looking for a better job in business. They go--and apparently they are not disappointed. Only 10 percent of those who are given a leave of absence without pay return to the military."

In most cases, a combination of many conditions convinces the officer to exchange his uniform for civilian work clothes. This was shown by the responses of 80 officers to the Defense Center for Leadership (FCL), which has distributed a report on the officer drain.

In addition to wages, which are becoming more and more important, the costs involved in moving are considered to be an important factor by the officers.

Haphazard Planning

They also complain that they have little influence in their own work. Military planning is seen as haphazard--it changes or it is totally absent. Poor planning or an absence of planning also troubles other personnel groups in the military and an absence of planning has been pointed out as a problem by contemporary historian Prof Nikolaj Petersen of Arhus University.

"The message is clear enough," Per Moller said. "Wages must be increased and improvements must be made in many areas, particularly personnel planning and transfers. Political stability is also high on the officers' wish list."

Officers whose training can be used immediately by civilian companies, such as pilots, technicians, and navigators, are leaving the military in the greatest numbers. This means undermanning and problems keeping our ships and planes moving. But officers with more general training are leaving and there is a shortage of staff officers.

Waste Of Resources

The officer drain is a terrible waste of resources. Typically, an officer leaves when he is 35 years old, i.e. when he is of the age, training, and experience that would allow him to do the most satisfactory job. The problem is exacerbated because, even though there is a greater will among young people to defend the country, officer training schools cannot be filled with qualified students.

"It is no longer enough for a young man to become an officer," Per Moller said. "It is no longer a calling. He demands a decent wage and decent working conditions."

Civilian Pilots Call-Up Possible

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 20 Feb 86 p 16

[Article: "Air Force Wants to Call Up Civilian Pilots"]

[Text] As early as next year the pilot drain from the military will be so serious that there will no longer be a pilot for every fighter plane. This will reduce our level of preparedness. Consequently, it may become necessary to issue a call-up or stand-by order for pilots who have recently left the military and have taken employment with civilian airlines, the Defense Ministry wrote in a note to the Defense Committee of parliament.

In the near future, the Defense Staff will develop a proposal for such an order.

Captain Carsten Dalgaard Jensen of the Military Pilots' Association said that the plan for a call-up order was not carefully thought out, nor would it solve the crisis caused by the pilot drain.

The association recently indicated that pilots who had handed in their resignation would withdraw them if Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) would participate in serious negotiations.

9336

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MILITARY

FRANCE

GIRAUD VIEWS MITTERRAND'S DEFENSE POLICIES

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Feb 86 p 2

[Article by Andre Giraud, former minister: "Yes to the Major Orientations, No to Their Implementation"]

[Text] The path of cohabitation on defense is not a dead end provided we raise the level of our armed forces, both nuclear and traditional.

After taking part in defense council meetings for 11 years, and considering that I have some understanding of technology, I felt challenged by president Mitterrand's sentence at the beginning of the text he just devoted to French foreign policy and defense: "In brief, I am interested in what my contradicitors have to say, when they mean what they say."

I shall not pick out the few passages that might give rise to polemics: to say that 1981 marked the date when our country's interest in high technology and advanced industries started is downright ludicrous, and joining in the election campaign by writing that "thanks to the administration of the Mauroy and Fabius governments, which is beginning to bear fruit, France is getting rid of its old complexes and getting used to the belief that it can win" sadly mars an otherwise lofty text.

The subject of French defense is a serious one in two respects: in itself, and because it is probably the most important of all subjects based on which a possible coexistence between the president and a future opposition government will be decided.

Let's rejoice that Francois Mitterrand is giving expression to a perfectly de Gaullian overall concept: Atlantic alliance, balance of forces in the world and in Europe, French deterrent strategy, "which, for our country, is still the best way if not to win the war at least not to have to make war," absolute determination not to let anyone intimidate us, concerning either nuclear tests or our arms development.

Although we may find fault--I shall come back to that later--with the attitude adopted toward the United States in the case of the SDI, the analysis that is made of this concept is beyond reproach, both in the technical considerations underlying it and in the judgments that are made of its foreseeable military

and political impact: "The SDI will remain a factor of destabilization for an indefinite time." It will strengthen neither French nor European security.

Finally, the third interesting facet of the work has to do with the link between defense and the construction of Europe, a subject on which, once again, Francois Mitterrand finds himself in perfect continuity with his predecessors. "The idea of Europe is indissociable from the idea of defense. But, for the time being, there is no defense but the Atlantic defense." He refers explicitly to the French-German treaty of 1963 signed by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, which constitutes "the only existing embryo of a joint European defense": the German pacifism and neutralism reflect "the will of a people who refuses to be an object-people." We must therefore promote French-German cooperation in the field of defense.

Thus, there could be considerable convergence on the major conceptual orientations of our defense. Alas! the same is not true of implementation. The president of the Republic's adhesion to sound defense concepts and even his personal intellectual contribution should under no circumstances be used as a smokescreen to hide the inadequacies, to say the least, of the socialist record, which it is urgent to remedy.

1. It is not accurate to say that our policy is satisfactory, even in the field of strategic determent, which is acknowledged to be fundamental. Contrary to the Americans, we do not have a land-based or airborne second strike force capacity. The interruption of the SX program, which was to provide us with a second mobile strategic component, is an extremely dangerous poker move. It assumes that our submarines will remain impossible to detect for many years to come, but technical progress makes that doubtful. This is what the budget cuts made to offset liberalities and waste have brought us. Similarly, it will have taken 12 to 15 years (assuming everything goes well) to build the seventh submarine which, in spite of what they are saying, had been decided before 1981. Military observation satellites whose development had begun in our time should be about ready to be launched.

Eureka, the Wrong Track

2. The French reaction to the SDI was uselessly aggressive toward our allies and turned into the wrong track, Eureka. The book reminds us that, already in 1984, we proposed to amend the treaty on the denuclearization of space by extending the ban to cover all "Star Wars" type weapons, and for a renewable 5-year period, which was all at once useless--since there will be no such weapons for the next 5 years--hostile to our allies, doomed to diplomatic failure, and finally impracticable because unverifiable. Also, why prevent our companies from working on Pentagon-financed research contracts if they deem it profitable? After clearly expressing our disagreement without being aggressive, we could on the contrary have done what we did in the nuclear field, we could have gone our own way and, when the time had come, we could have cashed on the positions we would have developed.

3. Starting what is now called Eureka was inappropriate. The president puts forward the (pertinent) idea that "technological uncoupling between Europe and America would be no less serious than military uncoupling." "Technological

"uncoupling" is expressive but vague. Shall we finally find in this book a way of knowing what Eureka is all about? "A central project around which industrial combines would be set up in a wide variety of fields." All right, but what kind of a project? As for me, I am very suspicious; Euratom was born of a similar inspiration and it turned into a huge and costly failure, but these things become apparent only after a few years. In both cases, we find ill-defined actions based on a general idea that is valid, but without any actual definition of the goal.

4. In addition to the continuous adaptation of our system, the actual reaction to the SDI should have been--and the president's analysis itself should have led to that conclusion--to try and progress both toward making good use of the French tactical nuclear weapons and toward building up a European defense system. In this respect, we must recognize that dearth prevails. The Hades program is dragging along, without any valid utilization concept. As for the neutron weapon, what the president says is that he will order its implementation "if it is proven that no negotiation on disarmament is successful," but nothing is said about its use. Concerning French forces in Germany the book contains only negative comments: "It is excluded that we should play a part in this system." "I cannot imagine that our troops would camp in the FRG as they do today and, on the first alert, would turn about and go home." The president believes that if a European conflict should start it would be impossible to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. He rejects the idea of extending the French strategic umbrella to cover Germany--and he may be right. He has the insight to point out that "since the European imbalance is essentially in traditional and chemical weapons, it would be logical to start there." But this is just an appeal to the public at large, with no practical effect.

In brief, nothing is done, or about to be done, although the problem is well defined: to deter traditional forces superior in number from attacking, possibly with chemical weapons. Now, it so happens that we possess the neutron weapon which is a theater-of-operation weapon capable of making up for NATO's inferior numbers and thus to deter any would-be aggressor. The conditions of its use, the definition of weapon systems and their handling could help materialize the French-German military dialogue which has recently suffered the failure of the combat tank and the European aircraft.

5. Finally, not a word is said to relieve the malaise affecting the army. Several brilliant senior officers have shown their concern by resigning or taking courageous stands. Officers were especially grateful to Charles Hernu for sparing them the worst of the socialist program, but they were fully aware of the deterioration of our defense system. These men, who chose and ideal and do not haggle when it comes to making sacrifices, want at least to understand what good these sacrifices will do.

Concerning the vast problem of European defense, they are fully aware that the government does not have a clear policy. Each of them thus finds his equipment and his troops inadequate to guard against all contingencies. In certain respects, it is indeed not an exaggeration to say that strategic determent would be another Maginot line if it were not accompanied by an effective doctrine of action during the preliminary stages of tension or even

European conflict; the equivalent of what a doctrine of utilization of armored divisions might have been in 1939.

In concluding this analysis, we may wonder whether the prerequisites for cohabitation are met. Let us say that, considering that there is adequate convergence on major orientations, it is not on the essential subject of defense that the path of cohabitation is a dead end. One prerequisite seems therefore to be fulfilled. However, an essential question remains unanswered: that of relations between the president and the prime minister in implementing a far more dynamic policy, a policy determined to raise the level of our armed forces, both nuclear and traditional, and to progress toward the actual construction of Europe. The answer to this question will be known only after the elections, and it will depend on their outcome.

9294

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MILITARY

NORWAY

WOMEN'S GROUPS LOBBY FOR LARGER FEMALE ROLE IN ARMED FORCES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 Mar 86 p 2

[Op Ed Article by Grethe Vaernø, Conservative Party MP, Oslo: "Armed Forces for Women and Men"]

[Text] It is Women's Day. The balance sheet is to be drawn up after the International Women's Decade--what we have gained in terms of equality, women's participation in the development process, and women's contributions in political life and in promoting peace in the world.

Equality in the armed forces is a subject which will possibly be omitted when the arithmetic is done, in spite of the fact that a real little revolution has taken place here in the last 10 years. Women have gone from close to the zero point to full equality on paper--with equal rights for jobs and training and the right to take on compulsory military service via first-time service.

Remarkable

An increase from under 7 percent to around 35 percent women in political life in under 20 years is almost unbelievable progress. Progress in the armed forces, the most hardened "male environment" we can imagine, is still more remarkable, especially when we think of how little pressure there has been from those activists who usually stand at the barricades against obsolete sex roles. On the contrary, it has often been the case that those women who have desired work and training in the armed forces have been opposed by their sisters as an element of the campaign against all armed forces--to the extent that they have attacked "women's solidarity."

Women's Voluntary Readiness, which has the job of informing about overall armed forces questions and of inciting women and their organizations to a contribution, is permanently represented in the Armed Forces Women's Council. In this council, which is constituted by, among others, the armed forces women supervisors and the ministry's equality adviser, questions come up which show that there is a long way to go until the system is an "equal rights" one.

Something to Slave Away At?

Is this, then, something to slave away at, ask many with very different points of reference?

The armed forces opponents dislike women's gaining a stronger association with the armed forces and thereby forming a counterbalance against their attempts to recruit women for an anti-armed-forces "peace movement."

Equality purists can think it is futile to strive for equality when in reality a fundamental inequality exists: It is impossible to create fair equal treatment for those persons who, on the one hand, have no choice, and, on the other hand, persons who can choose freely for themselves after a private assessment of advantages and disadvantages.

Equality pessimists can fear that this "little difference" will prove to be very big when the two sexes are to function together under very special circumstances in peace and extreme conditions in a possible war. They will in any case make haste slowly.

Some politicians, from bottom to top, have without enthusiasm or direct opposition given into the equality wave with loud concern over how it would go.

Man's Job?

A large number--perhaps a majority of men (and women?) in and outside the armed forces--are inwardly convinced that the armed forces are and ought to be a "man's job." Some are angered over the fact that women have "forced themselves in"; some react with "benevolent opposition," while many allow themselves to be persuaded by or in any case loyally accept the political decisions.

Women--and some men--who have seen things in another light have stood against this army of opponents.

Some have thought of women. Equality work has largely speaking been based on breaking down sex roles, eliminating discrimination and showing that women "can." The armed forces are in an equal position here with other man's jobs. At the same time the armed forces are in a way male society's last and strongest entrenchment. If we do not manage to get equality to work here, it will pull the bottom out from under the equality philosophy which has been prevailing.

Greater Breadth

Others have thought of the armed forces, of getting a broader and broader recruiting basis, of ensuring an influx from critical occupations, and of filling up when the classes shrink. A mixed environment as much as possible like the civilian society everyone comes from and goes to is seen as positive by many, too. These views will gradually gain ground as it is shown that the objections are put to shame.

What ought to have the most uniting effect both for women and men who believe that interest in defense and a defense capacity are totally decisive for the country's future is all the same the "political" influence. Today women constitute a third of all those who must make the political decisions regarding our defense and security policy, too. What do they know about the armed forces? What relationship do they have to them? Regardless of the discussion regarding compulsory military service, armed forces which are open to women in an equal and co-responsible manner will signal outwardly that this is men's and women's common issue. It is men's and women's common contribution to peace for a small country. It is for this reason that we are slaving away.

8831

CSO: 3639/88

MILITARY

NORWAY

STUDY CONFIRMS INCREASING SOVIET INTEREST IN NORWEGIAN SEA

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Mar 86 p 5


[Commentary by Liv Hegna: "Norwegian Sea and Security: Fear of Facts"]

[Text] Data which the armed forces are now releasing demonstrate in no uncertain manner that the Norwegian Sea is on the point of becoming a Soviet naval empire. Without parallel, the Soviet naval summer exercise in 1985 was the biggest of the times in these waters. In the meantime, the military, politicians and researchers are vying to produce the most possible different arguments for increased American presence in the north. The Labor Party's politicians are responding by reviving the old fear that allied vessels are carrying nuclear weapons when they visit Norwegian ports.

With this, it may be able to be asserted that Labor Party politicians are turning the issue upside down: The approach to the problem can no longer be to place the most possible obstacles in the way of Western attempts to maintain the waters north and west of Norway as international. The point must now be to win for Norway the greatest influence over further developments in these areas.

Perhaps there are individual political circles who have exaggerated notions to the effect that Norway contributes best to low tension in the north through strong reserve, and that we look after our own interests best by pursuing what NATO Secretary General Lord Peter Carrington a few days ago called Norway's "a la carte" policy in the NATO context. Carrington answered a question whether Norway's base policy and nuclear weapons policy are compatible with the alliance's more recent way of thinking and how the Soviet challenge in the north is to be met.

Because of fishing regulations, the time is long past when British naval vessels sailed in the Barents Sea. The standing Atlantic force (STANAVFOR-LANT) normally does not cross 24 degrees east longitude when it is on its annual visit in North Norway. The Germans have built up an ocean-going naval fleet primarily with antisubmarine duties, since the air protection which aircraft carriers can provide is lacking. The French are taking part in NATO exercises at sea, but they too far north only as an exception.



Growth in Soviet Naval Exercises. The top chart shows the number of surface combat vessels taking part, and the bottom, vessel-days. Until the Soviet Summerex 1985, the OKEAN exercise in 1975 was the biggest as far as the number of vessels taking part is concerned. If the number of surface vessels in Soviet exercises in the Norwegian Sea is multiplied by days at sea, completely different results are seen: Summerex 1985 was four times as big as OKEAN. The charts were prepared by the armed forces.

Thirty-Three Days

American aircraft carrier groups have been in Norwegian waters for 13 days over the last 10 years. What was submitted as a new naval strategy during the Ocean Safari exercise in 1985 was that the aircraft carrier the USS America sailed into Norwegian fjords to look for the protection Norway's geography can provide. That the Soviet naval exercise the same year exercised for the first time in aircraft carrier group operations and combating them is interpreted by Norwegian military men as an indication of the fact that the Russians over the last few years have trained for complex operations at sea with antiaircraft defense, antisubmarine operations and warfare against surface vessels. It is presumed that the level in terms of command/control has been raised to a considerably higher one after the Soviet Summerex 1985.

Editor Frank Bjerkholt writes in the last issue of NORSK MILITAERT TIDSSKRIFT [NORWEGIAN MILITARY JOURNAL] that the submarine violations in Swedish waters have the purpose of accustoming the Swedes to the situation, and he concludes by saying that the Soviet Union thinks that Sweden should come to terms with this activity and acknowledge the superior Soviet interests in the Baltic region. Can Bjerkholt's point of view be transferred to Norway and the situation in the Norwegian Sea? The answer is probably no for the time being, but no one knows what the future will show.

Norwegian Assistance

The low tension in the north will not be retained by creating doubt regarding the allied will to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring a "title" to presence in the region through a systematic exercise program. To what extent the answer is the permanent presence of American forces or more frequent allied exercises in the area can be discussed. Under both circumstances the precondition will be that Norway makes repair facility capacity available.

The only drydock in the northern part of our country is in Harstad. It, for that matter, cannot accept vessels much larger than our own frigates and coast guard vessels. There is no base possibility in North Norway for advanced warships. There is some repair facility capacity in South Norway, but the more advanced electronic components on board American vessels will certainly be attended to by the crews themselves.

If we are to exert an influence on developments and see to it that Norwegian politicians maintain control over what happens outside our front door, it is important that a stand be taken on the question of the development of repair facility capacities for foreign vessels. Through the chain of command within NATO with the supreme commanders in each part of the country as top leaders, there is no danger that our national control over this apparatus will slip out of our hands. All allied military plans are approved by Norwegian politicians, and during war time a Norwegian politician has been designated as the government's own representative at the North Command at Kolsås.

Allied fleets in the Norwegian Sea will require Norwegian assistance. The more actively politicians can assist here, the stronger our influence will be. It seems a matter of course that the commanders of land-based facilities at any time should be Norwegian. The solution which was chosen for the AWACS planes in Ørland can serve as a model also for naval forces: Only individual technical specialists are foreigners. The rest of the people are Norwegian in their entirety. The political realities residing in the Soviet naval buildup in the north are being met with active cooperation within the alliance. Recent political remarks regarding a "New-Zealandizing" of Norway are /not/ [in italics] the result of a consciousness of our own importance in the teamwork in NATO.

8831

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MILITARY

PORUGAL

DEFENSE SEEN AS DEPENDENT ON NATIONAL EFFORT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 11 Mar 86 p 7

[Article by Virgilio de Carvalho: "New Scenarios, New Risks, New Strategies"]

[Text] The new course of Moscow's discourse is beginning to be clear. As quoted in an article in THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE on 25 February 1986, the Soviet ambassador in Washington spoke of a "joint era" for the superpowers, because they are fated to coexist if they are to avoid plunging together into a nuclear holocaust. He proposes reducing the risk of a nuclear confrontation in Europe, where it looms most acutely, by eliminating the American and Soviet Euromissiles, on condition that this is not utilized to justify an escalation in the race for superiority in other weaponry, and he suggested that "starpeace" replace "starwars." Mr Gorbachev said practically the same thing at the 27th Congress of the CPU, but in different fashion, defining development, which he termed the key to all the problems of the USSR, as the main goal of the new Soviet leadership. Thus the American advances in the realm of the "militarization of space" and conventional weaponry, and the problems which keeping up with the technological advances of the U.S. would pose in terms of the strengthening of the economy, seem still to be the main concerns of Moscow.

The "Gorbachev Era" and the West

The Western Europeans have reacted to the new line of argument from Moscow by voicing their fear of being blackmailed by the USSR if the United States withdraws its missiles from Europe, as a result of their inferior strength in conventional weaponry. And the Reagan administration has fought to prevent cuts in the defense budget it has proposed, arguing that it was the costly American technological challenge which led Moscow to return to the table at Geneva and to change its line of discourse. It must be added that the Soviet arguments still reveal the desire to apply detente to Europe alone, which, as we know, could be "Finlandized" through the exploitation of its high level of dependence on foreign sources for energy products and strategic ores. This means that there is no guarantee yet of any change in the intention of the USSR to destroy the geopolitical balance of the world to its own advantage, by separating Europe from the United States, or any guarantee that we are not seeing instead a new strategy for strengthening the Soviet capacity to dig more efficiently in the sand around its base in Europe, by winning over the

public and exploiting targets of opportunity in the regions where its dependence is greatest.

The End of the EEC Veto

The elimination of the rule calling for unanimity in the EEC seems likely to deprive the small powers of any possibility of recourse to the veto to defend their vital interests. Thus it will be urgently necessary for Portugal to recognize these interests and to formulate its main strategy to safeguard them, particularly where agreements with partners based on mutual convenience are concerned, since it is not certain that we will not end up with a "Europe of the fatherlands." Since there can be no doubt that it is in the vital interest of Portugal to maintain its individuality on the peninsula, and that this is the result of its Euro-Atlantic geopolitical position and the almost archipelagic location of the country, it seems that it will be essential to maintain the cohesion of the archipelagoes and the continent and to benefit from the continental coast and the maritime territory as privileged sources of our identity, development and freedom of action; to avoid Iberian and Ibero-American strategies; to persevere in the historically privileged relationships with the maritime countries in Northern Europe, with the Maritime Power, with the Portuguese-speaking community and with countries outside Europe with an interest in Portugal as a member of the EEC; and to compensate for the political need for regionalization through the centralization and coordination of strategic activities such as foreign relations (diplomatic, economic and cultural), defense, education and foreign transport, in order to guarantee action as a bloc in dealing with foreign issues.

The United States, Spain and Portugal

Portugal has parcels of territory in areas which have been regarded as of strategic interest by the United States (Azores) and Spain (Madeira and the continent), to judge from the defense plans of both these nations. And there is always the risk that an effort will be made to turn Spain into a kind of guardian of NATO's Ibero-Atlantic area, which lies in Portugal's geostrategic space, on the pretext that the Portuguese military vacuum makes Portuguese-Spanish military cooperation therein desirable. And this risk might increase in the event of a future withdrawal of its military contingent from Europe by the United States, following the development of conventional weapons justifying the abandonment of nuclear weapons intended to deter the Warsaw Pact countries from invading Europe. The fact is that this possibility could increase the importance of the peripheral areas around Great Britain and the Ibero-Atlantic region, as the remaining pillars in a new concept of Atlantic defense, thus increasing the dangers of shared responsibility by the United States and Spain for the defense of the Portuguese geostrategic space.

Apart from the important issues of deterrence and containment of Warsaw Pact aggression, which are the basic goals of NATO, it is further necessary to take into account the "wars" on the issues of European autonomy and assertion in relation to the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, as well as by some of the European partners in it. It is mainly within this last context, involving sovereignty and negotiating capacity among allies, and not the framework of a hypothetical military invasion by Spain, that those who want to

demonstrate that certain military resources are not necessary, on the basis of their frightening cost, and that the need for certain numbers and types thereof also needs to be discussed, situate their arguments.

Portugal has established priority concerns having to do with development. But this does not mean that a rearment plan cannot be discussed and approved in the parliament, reflecting a determination to assume the responsibilities inherent in the size of its territory and the exclusive use of it. A first phase in such a plan should take into simultaneous accounts the minimal needs dictated by national sovereignty and those related to allied defense of its space. Otherwise, it is hard to see how technological and financial aid could be attracted to the country. This aid might be channeled to Spain, on the assumption that it can be trusted to assume the responsibilities for collective defense which should fall to Portugal. This would increase the risk of lack of cohesion and of a subordinate role for the country in its own geostrategic space.

Portugal cannot be compared to a country like Japan, which was able to develop while poorly armed, in the shadow of U.S. military protection, without risk to its individuality. If the people of Portugal entrust their defense entirely to their allies, the country would run the risk of being divided, and becoming a kind of satellite of Spain, which seems interested in penetrating the space in which Portugal asserts its rights, not only geostrategic (ZEE and Iberlant), but also in the Portuguese-speaking community, and again in the privileged relationship with the Maritime Power, thanks to the bilateral defense treaty with the United States, which will continue, whether or not it remains in NATO.

5157
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MILITARY

SWEDEN

ARMED FORCES CHIEF DESIGNATE ON BUDGET, PROCUREMENT ISSUES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Mar 86 p 3

[Op Ed Article by Lieutenant General Bengt Gustafsson, supreme commander designate of the Armed Forces: "What if 25 Billion Were Invested Wrongly?"; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] Bengt Gustafsson is a lieutenant general and will become the new OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces] on 1 October.

The debate that flares up now and then concerning the balance between quality and quantity in the Armed Forces calls for a few comments.

Military technology is developing very rapidly. At the moment, the pace is accelerating in the struggle between weapons and countermeasures, chiefly through developments in the field of electronics. It is becoming increasingly difficult to foresee the outcome of duels between different weapon systems. The wrong choice of technology or poor tactical application can have far-reaching consequences. One example of this was Israel's quick neutralization of Syrian air defenses in the Lebanese War.

In our country, decisions concerning the development and procurement of defense materiel as well as the choice of technical aspiration levels in connection with weapon systems are reached following very serious preparatory work. There are few countries where cooperation is as well developed as it is here among tacticians in the various service branches, the Defense Research Institute's operations analysts and researchers, and technicians from the Defense Materiel Administration and industry. As a rule, that cooperation results in competent studies on which to base a decision.

Conditions are therefore good for the weapon system studies that are part of the work of prospective planning and program planning now being done in preparation for Parliament's defense decisions. But in view of the complexity of the issues involved, there may be reason to explain the resources and methods used in connection with that activity.

Ability To Use Technology

In my opinion, we have our greatest difficulties when it comes to making a correct assessment of people's ability to use technology and of the influence of tactics on the outcome of a battle, not to mention the ability to command, which is the crucial factor in many situations. The work to prepare data for materiel development certainly includes tactical studies and practical trials in a combat situation, but often not to the extent justified by the degree of difficulty involved.

The danger exists that development of the Armed Forces is governed too much by what is most easily observable--that is, the technical factors, which it is easier to simulate using mathematical models.

Our tactics are also evaluated in connection with the exercises that are held. The military exercises that have been resumed in recent years have made it possible also to test the weapon systems in actual operation. But those exercises are not set up specifically with technical-tactical evaluations in mind. Their primary purpose must be that of training.

A thoroughgoing technical-tactical evaluation must be carried out during an exercise clearly restricted to that specific purpose, and enough funds must be available for recording what happens and making the evaluation. Those conditions have, among other things, been elucidated by the National Accounting and Audit Bureau.

No Certain Outcome

Over the past 2 years, a type of exercise known as FOCUS has been conducted for the above-mentioned purpose under the command of CE-1 (Attack Command). Those exercises involve large-scale testing of the technology, tactics, and combat techniques of our reconnaissance and strike aircraft against our antiaircraft defenses and vice versa. In the heat of the battle, some representatives of the service branches felt that their preconceived ideas were being confirmed, but what the necessarily time-consuming evaluation confirmed more than anything else was the fact that the human factor and tactics have a great influence on the final outcome.

We now have valuable data on which to base not only the further development of tactics and combat techniques in both those areas, but also, and especially, the necessary gradual technical modernization of our weapon systems.

Similar, but more deliberate verification in practice could be arranged for other weapon systems and for the purpose of comparing the results of various tactical deployments.

Many participants in the debate today see the obvious--for example, the increased vulnerability of naval forces and the infantry to modern air forces--but not the countermeasures--in terms of tactical development, for example--that are being implemented at the same time. The outcome of a serious evaluation of action against a mechanized opponent by an infantry

brigade 77 using advanced delaying fieldworks in typical Swedish terrain and supported by aircraft is probably not as certain as some participants in the debate believe.

We Must Be Able To Afford it

It is clear that a more general introduction of such practical verifications is associated with new costs, especially since, in some cases, we may need to come up with technical testing devices that do not exist in our own organization. But the question is whether we can afford not to do so.

As someone said, what if 25 billion kronor per year were being spent on the wrong defense deployments? The greater complexity of technology and of the interplay between technology and tactics justifies greater efforts, as do the doubts concerning the current balance between the two that have recently appeared both in and out of the Armed Forces. This brings me to the question of how decisions concerning that balance should be reached.

Somewhere, a decision must be reached on the balance between the various weapon systems and between quality and quantity. That weighing out requires competence in many areas: operational conditions and those related to security policy, military technology, and finances, but also in the areas of tactics and combat technique as well as that of production conditions for the various weapon systems. My contention is that competence is hardest to acquire when it comes to understanding the interplay between technology and tactics within and among the various weapon systems and the human factor.

Evaluating Possibilities

The structure of an all-inclusive Military Council therefore provides the best chance for breadth and depth in competence, as does the special research organization that cuts across the lines dividing weapon systems in the line organization. That research organization includes not only officers with lengthy line experience but also specialists in operations analysis, military engineering, finance, and production.

Based on the preceding discussion, however, the research organization should be rounded out by the addition of a special group for evaluating weapon systems already in service. This would make experience available for the tactical development and modernization of weapon systems, and it would also provide feedback for the research organization. Such a step ought to improve the conditions for evaluating tactical possibilities in the future development of the Armed Forces more accurately than is now the case.

It should be possible to provide more measurable results concerning the interplay between technology and tactics for skeptics both in and out of the Armed Forces. And--in both the worst and the best case--mistakes in spending will also be discovered.

Especially heavy demands will be placed on military "generalists," who are responsible for heading up the work, compiling the final evaluation of

research results, and checking them out in practice. They must be able to evaluate the material as it is produced by various specialists and to combine it into an overall view covering all aspects.

Special pains must be taken to prepare them for that difficult task. Some of them are therefore assigned to take short international management courses or to gain practical experience in business and industry.

But the complexity of technology and of the interplay between technology and a human organization is not unique to the Armed Forces. The approach represented by operations analysis is common property in a modern industrial society and in the technology departments of universities.

It should be possible to develop special courses for our generalists at one or the other of our universities, where they could cooperate more systematically with university researchers and representatives of other sectors of society in developing their ability to produce data on which to base decisions concerning a complicated operational, technical, and financial system.

Eliminating a Breeding Ground

If that helped to increase the university world's interest in questions concerned with security policy, defense policy, and military engineering, perhaps—as is true in other countries—we would be able to increase exchanges of personnel and flows of information among the established ministries, government authorities, Armed Forces schools, research and other institutes, and the university world. We all need mutual stimulation in combating rigid forms.

More openness between the foreign policy establishment, the Armed Forces, and the universities would probably also eliminate the breeding ground for some preconceived ideas.

11798
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MILITARY

SWEDEN

URGENT REFORMS SEEN NEEDED IN RECRUIT TRAINING

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 7 Mar 86 p 3

[Op Ed Article by Gunnar Petri, director general of the Defense Modernization Institute: "It Is not Possible To Wait Until 1992"]

[Text] The countdown to the 1987 defense decision has begun. The OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces] has spoken his mind in the OB-85 report, and the Defense Committee has talked about what it wants cleared up before the final stands are taken this fall.

One might therefore think that everything is fine and that the politicians have only to determine budget and policy on the basis of balanced data. The thesis of this article is that such is not the case in one essential respect.

Materiel Only

Producing wartime organization units requires procurement of weapons and other equipment as well as investments in the form of training and exercises for conscripts and officers. From the standpoint of cost, those two components are about equal in weight. But the additional money called for at higher levels in OB-85 will go almost entirely to materiel. Human investment is practically unchanged at the various levels, not only in orientation but also in scope.

But why is it so important now to also begin discussing that aspect of the question in a less biased way?

One of OB-85's merits is that it describes some of the shortcomings in today's organization with considerable frankness. Considering what a sensitive matter it is for the Military Council to critique its own activity--keeping in mind both internal morale and external reactions--one can say that the signals are quite clear. It is stated quite frankly that some of our most important units have not received adequate joint training and that they are not always combat ready immediately after mobilization.

Attack Difficult

The arms buildup and improvements in the quality of units in the world around us are eloquently described in OB-85, and it is clearly stated that our priority units must be able, as the report puts it, to meet, check, and defeat even a potential opponent's most modern and best trained units and to do so immediately after mobilization. And naturally, this has basic significance from the standpoint of our neutrality policy. Our organization must be regarded as being in a position to repel attacks by taking the offensive, not just as being capable of delaying an advance pending the arrival of help.

Besides those signals in OB-85, there are also other signs indicating that we must also beef up our most important wartime organization units in terms of personnel, including both conscripts and officers. As one example, evaluations of the major defense exercises point in that direction.

It is not an easy task to lead and carry out offensive operations against the Army divisions of the big powers. It is important that we have materiel for that mission. But it is equally important that we have militia-based soldiers and officers who can do the job. And in that area, no priorities are planned.

So what is the situation with the system we have today and the one we will also have, according to OB-85, at the turn of the century?

Entire Annual Contingent

Let us confine our argument to the Army. Under the current system in the Army, the idea is that the entire annual contingent is to be trained for assignment to the so-called field units--that is, 20 modern brigades, from 6 to 8 brigades with older equipment, and support units.

In principle--that is, when there is enough money--conscripts and officers have the opportunity during one or two refresher courses to function as a single wartime organization unit. Generally after 12 years, conscripts are transferred to local units, which therefore consist of soldiers between the ages of 32 and 47. In connection with that transfer of personnel from the field units to local defense units, there is usually another refresher course, and there may be still another course some time later.

Another way of saying it is that every year we spend about the same amount on the same training for the Army's entire annual draft contingent. After that, as part of the wartime organization, they are assigned directly to field units, with some going to priority brigades and others to brigades with lower priority. All soldiers eventually wind up in local defense units.

Demands of the Future

That system has obvious merit. We get younger soldiers for the wartime organization's more demanding duties and older soldiers for more stationary combat duties. The system is easy to understand and well established. It makes no distinction among conscripts except as regards officer and NCO

selection and the slightly varying content of the training required for the various branches of service.

There is reason to wonder, however, whether that system corresponds to the demands of the future. As far as materiel is concerned, we long ago began to assign higher priority to certain types of brigades, and it is completely clear that we are going to be forced to do so to an even greater extent in the future, regardless of economic level. But from the standpoint of personnel, we are still living in a world where an entire annual contingent is treated exactly the same.

Career officers must be given a real chance to learn to command those advanced units in the right way, and the conscripts in those units must be given such capability that they will be able to participate in offensive operations as soon as they are mobilized. We know that our conceivable opponents have greatly increased their ability to launch attacks on us quickly using advanced units. We also calculate that the danger of our being drawn into a conflict right at the start has increased. The demands on us have increased.

Increased Demands

At the same time, demands on the local defense units are also changing. The threat of sabotage, diversionary units, and airborne landings presumably makes it necessary to shorten mobilization times. Familiarity with one's locality and proximity to the staging area will become more important.

In short, one can say that in the training and exercises provided for officers and soldiers in the priority brigades, there must be a greater emphasis on developing a capability for leadership and coordinated action. This is necessary--and it requires a great deal in the way of resources. At the same time, a different type of intensification in training exercises for the local defense units is also required.

Alternative Models

One possibility might be to abandon the idea of training all of the Army's conscripts for immediate duty in the field units and to decide instead to train some for duties in the priority brigades and others for brigades with less priority or for duties related to local defense.

Refresher courses could then be concentrated on substantial unit exercises for the priority brigades, with smaller but more frequent exercises for the local defense units. This model could be varied in several ways.

Another possibility might be to train all of the Army's conscripts for the priority brigades but to shorten the time during which they are assigned to those brigades as part of the wartime organization. In that way, the efforts of conscripts would be concentrated on the time during which they are assigned to genuinely skilled tasks in the wartime units, and the average age of those in the priority brigades would be lower.

Politically Impossible

Perhaps a lengthening or redistribution of the period of service for some of the Army's conscripts following the pattern in the Navy could be discussed. Other variations also exist.

The important thing is, however, that the discussion be based on the demands placed by modern warfare on our units and our soldiers.

When the question of how to approach instruction and training activities in the Army is brought up, the natural reflex is to link it with the peacetime organization and, as a result, the shutting down of units. That problem is also touched on--although rather lightly--in OB-85.

It says that after 1992, when the number of young men reaching draft age will decline quite substantially, an adjustment in the number of military establishments will be made. And it should be noted that the drop in the number of draft-age men will then be such that what we are talking about is the elimination within just a few years of five or six medium-sized regiments. This is in reality a cardinal issue: such an extensive slaughter of regiments within a year or so or more is in fact impossible both objectively and, as they say, politically.

Workable Idea

Variations in the size of the draft-age contingent alone will not make any major changes in the peacetime organization necessary during the coming 5-year period. It is gratifying that this was noted in a recent government decision which also suggested the possibility of an interim decision concerning the peacetime organization after the 1987 defense decision but before 1992.

It is wrong, however, to view the whole thing simply as a matter of adjusting to changing birth rates. The question is how we are going to get the proper return from the tremendous investment in training and instruction activity.

A workable idea for doing so is lacking at present. So far, the military have not come up with a usable basis for a policy decision in 1987. Nor have the Defense Committee and the government shown any desire to ask for alternatives whose main thrust would be different from the current one.

It therefore looks as though the 1987 defense decision will have to be reached without any real discussion or even basic information on those questions. It is simply becoming too late, and the debate will therefore be concerned with the various increases for equipment procurement that are provided within the various budget limits.

Train Is Leaving

And the train leaves in 1987. All experience seems to show that it is not possible to effect any major changes in direction except in the context of previous defense decisions. This means that in the runup to the 1992 defense

decision, we will have gotten ourselves into a situation involving almost insuperable demands for structural changes and one in which training and instruction activity will still not provide us with units of effective and jointly trained personnel until close to the turn of the century.

There are several reasons why we are winding up in this situation now. One is the problem's degree of difficulty. But it is also much easier to conduct the debate in terms of the requirements for new equipment which, taken by itself, is necessary and well justified. In so doing, no ingrained opinions are disturbed--no disagreeable questions regarding regional policy are brought up, and one is not forced to assign priorities in the utilization of conscripts.

Discussion Easier

Perhaps that is why it is so much easier to talk about the 40 or 50 billion kronor to be invested in the development and procurement of equipment during the coming 5-year period than to think seriously about how we are spending the equally large sum that is being used for human investment for the same purpose.

It is not possible to wait until 1992. There is reason, therefore, to keep in mind the idea of an interim decision in 1988 or 1989 concerning the structure of training and the policy that will apply to the peacetime organization. Let us therefore make a real effort so as to be able at that time to reach a decision on a genuine defense reform even as regards personnel.

11798

CSO: 3650/157

MILITARY

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

NAVY BUYING SPANISH PLANE--Goteborg--The Navy and Coast Guard have both ordered new airplanes. Their choice is the Spanish CASA, which was the winner in a lengthy battle among various manufacturers. In an initial phase, Swedair offered its secondhand Twin Otter aircraft at a low price, but the customers showed lukewarm interest, writes FLYGREVYN in the issue that will be out in a few days. They were afraid that the plane would capsize during an emergency landing on water. The Coast Guard, which currently flies Cessna-402's, is taking a big step up in size with its purchase of two CASA-212's. The new turboprop aircraft have a takeoff weight of close to 8.5 metric tons. A civil version of the CASA-212 can carry 26 passengers. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 2 Mar 86 p 33] 11798

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ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

KIECHLE DEFENDS GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURE POLICIES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 3 Mar 86 pp 82-93

[Interview with Ignaz Kiechle, Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forestry by SPIEGEL reporter, date and place not given: "Why Don't I Plant a Forest?"]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr. Minister, this is an election year in the three agricultural Laender of Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony and Bavaria. The farmers are threatening to desert the CSU/CDU. At the end of the year will you be left standing as the black sheep of the government?

KIECHLE: In an impartial evaluation of what we have accomplished--tax advantages, additional aid in disadvantaged areas, which we have also broadened our definition of, improvements in the social sector and resistance to plans for price reductions in Brussels--I really don't think I will be left standing.

SPIEGEL: Obviously these accomplishments do not satisfy the farmers. Polls show that nearly one out of every two farmers is intending to express his disapproval of your policies by refusing to vote or by voting for another party.

KIECHLE: There will certainly not be that many who will do so. And besides, the farmers are not demonstrating and protesting against the minister personally, but rather because they want to bring it to his attention that they cannot live with current farm prices. They are only using the minister as a medium.

SPIEGEL: The ability of a minister of agriculture has always been measured by the price increases he fought for in Brussels. Now the warehouses are brimming over; higher prices are no longer possible.

KIECHLE: I do not fail to mention in my public appearances that it is absolutely necessary to eliminate the cause of this drop in prices, namely over-production.

SPIEGEL: Your party chairman, Franz Josef Strauss, wants to know what you are going to do to get the farmers to continue to vote CSU. What do you have to offer him?

KIECHLE: Basically, I have already consulted with him on what has happened to date. Following this series of national aid packages we want additionally to prevent further setbacks during the next price discussions in Brussels.

SPIEGEL: If there is a setback during the Landtag elections in Bavaria, will you be sacrificed by Franz Josef Strauss?

KIECHLE: Considerations regarding the composition of the next cabinet have not yet been discussed. Surely the word "sacrifice" is not appropriate. We are not barbarians.

SPIEGEL: The farmers complain that although they voted in the CSU, prices always seem to drop whenever a CSU minister is in charge of the department of agriculture.

KIECHLE: That is really not so. As long as there was still something to distribute, up until 1969 under the Christian Democrats and until about 1974 under the Social/Liberal coalition, the farmers were completely satisfied. The disaster began when we were no longer able to sell and pay for increasing production. The truth is that in 1975 at the latest it was apparent that there was no demand for increasing production. But no politician reacted to the situation.

SPIEGEL: But you are not reacting to it either. You oppose changing the present system in which ever increasing prices drive production onward.

KIECHLE: The phrase "ever increasing prices" is inappropriate. Prices have in fact gone down. If it were true that production declines along with sinking prices, then we would have been cultivating less grain, for example, for some time now. But the opposite is what is happening.

SPIEGEL: And that is the problem. You drive the people to produce more and more when their income goes down.

KIECHLE: But it is precisely that which shows that we cannot influence quantities by means of lower or stagnant prices. That is my conviction, too, and that is why I am opposed. Only farmer income is being lowered here. But the market problems are in no way being dealt with--unless we let prices sink so low that some of the farmers go bankrupt.

SPIEGEL: Nevertheless, the EC commission wants to lower prices during the next round of price talks. Last year you showed your opposition with a veto. Would you do so again?

KIECHLE: In any case I would employ all options to prevent a targeted price reduction policy.

SPIEGEL: Won't that wear thin?

KIECHLE: It would if I just say no. But I will make very concrete proposals in Brussels.

SPIEGEL: What kind?

KIECHLE: The funds which are being used anyway for agricultural policies in Brussels should in the future be spent for reducing rather than increasing production. The basic tenet of this round of negotiations must be: Promote non-production rather than production.

SPIEGEL: Shouldn't the basic tenet rather be: Let EC farm prices fall over the long term to the level of the international market? Have you ever thought about that?

KIECHLE: Yes, I have thought long and hard about that. The international market price is not a price which is based on costs in each of the producing countries. The United States, for example, subsidizes the wheat exports of its farmers just as we do.

SPIEGEL: Pointing out the sins of others does not help. The fact is that the world's largest agricultural exporter, the EC, sells its products on international markets at cut-rate prices. How is this market expected to function?

KIECHLE: On that point I agree with you completely.

SPIEGEL: West Germans pay more than two marks for a pack of butter; only about 25 or 30 pfennigs are left for the EC on the international market.

KIECHLE: With beef it is even worse. I agree with you completely. We have to get away from this system, but it is only possible if we limit quantities.

SPIEGEL: What is the situation with beef?

KIECHLE: We currently cut the price of fresh beef that is sold on the international market from about DM 7.20 per kg to about DM 3.50. For frozen meat that is purchased within the EC for DM 8.30, the EC gets only DM 1.30 from the Russians.

SPIEGEL: Statistics show the results of the current policy. Within one year the grain reserves of the EC increased from just under six to nearly 17 million metric tons.

KIECHLE: It is completely illusory to think that we can produce 10 or 20 percent more than we can sell for many more years within the protective environs of the EC. We must very quickly reduce production.

SPIEGEL: Reduce it with the aid of even more planned economics. In the future will you prescribe how much each farmer is allowed to produce?

KIECHLE: As always. It need not be an entirely planned economy. Milk quotas are also only partly the result of a planned economy. We have drawn an upper limit and said: Up to this level you get a guaranteed price; if you produce more than that you get the international market price. And that is about 20 pfennigs. The farmer is not forbidden under penalty to produce more. We could also have a similar procedure with other products.

SPIEGEL: Your assistant secretary, Gallus, is of an entirely different opinion. He wrote recently, "The quota system which has been introduced for the sugar and milk markets ought not to be extended to other products."

KIECHLE: Insofar as Assistant Secretary Gallus represents official policy, he represents my policy. Insofar as he speaks as an FDP man, I have discussions with him.

SPIEGEL: It must in fact be disconcerting when a government which preaches a market economy then backs a planned economy.

KIECHLE: I don't see it that way. It is precisely in the areas of life's necessities that there is intervention everywhere. Take the Rhine-Ruhr transportation association--there the user pays about one quarter of the actual costs. The rest is paid by the state. Why it has to be different with food is not easy for me to understand, particularly since agriculture is not a homogeneous entity. Sometimes you have 10 cm of humus, sometimes 1.5 meters; some farmers have two months of winter, others have six, not even taking elevation into account.

SPIEGEL: And the state should even things out?

KIECHLE: In parts of agriculture we do have true competition. In the past 25 years the number of farms has declined from nearly 1.5 million to now just 720,000. And regarding the question of humus: When an uncontrolled market economy rules, only the large-scale farmers in good areas will survive. Nobody wants to see that happen.

SPIEGEL: For the coming round of price talks the EC commission is suggesting that only the top-quality grain be purchased at the agreed price, the rest for a cheaper price. This would correspond to a price reduction of about three percent. Could you come back home with such a solution?

KIECHLE: Not exactly. We want to increase the price for top-quality grain and allow the market to set the price for the lesser quality grains. Our intention here is to divert part of the grain into feeding troughs.

SPIEGEL: Why should the other EC members allow you to collect surcharges for the better quality grains produced in Germany? The lower quality grains of the English would then end up underpriced in the feeding troughs.

KIECHLE: The English have exactly the same opportunity as we do either to convert to high-quality grains . . .

SPIEGEL: . . . then it will be even worse . . .

KIECHLE: . . . or to stick with low-quality grains. Since the British have depended on low-quality grains up to now, they have profited from the present system.

SPIEGEL: The surcharges would result in everyone going over to high-quality grains.

KIECHLE: First of all it will not work for everybody. Secondly, high-quality grain on the average yields perhaps 50 to 60 double hundredweight of grain per hectare, low-quality grain 100 double hundredweight. Our problem is too much grain, not too much quality.

SPIEGEL: You cannot accept the suggestion of the commission which amounts to a de facto average reduction in grain prices?

KIECHLE: I will not accept it.

SPIEGEL: Perhaps you will find more agreement within the commission with another idea. You would like German farmers to produce more biological raw materials for industrial use.

KIECHLE: Since the foodstuffs market will remain constant, because the population in the EC will scarcely increase and because per capita consumption will not increase appreciably, we must see to it that we divert productive efforts into other channels. Of course, we cannot allow things to become more expensive.

SPIEGEL: But they will. And nothing helps: In the southern countries fruit for energy production can be cultivated much more profitably than in Lower Saxony, for example. You already have a new kind of market order, only more expensive than the old one.

KIECHLE: No, we want by all means to allow a market economy to develop. If the southern countries of the EC are in a position to produce these raw materials better, then they should do so.

SPIEGEL: That does not help out your own large-scale farmers in Schleswig-Holstein.

KIECHLE: That is absolutely not true. If less beef were to be produced in other parts of the EC, it would also help out here.

SPIEGEL: How is it supposed to work, then, in actual practice? Can you explain it to farmer Jan Kordes in Lower Saxony?

KIECHLE: As he has done up to now he plants grain or sugar beets . . .

SPIEGEL: . . . and gets for it, as up to now, a guaranteed price?

KIECHLE: To be sure, he does not exactly get a guaranteed price, but he does get a price that is within a certain range that enables him to make calculations. Then the industrial plant which produces this alcohol in my opinion produces it on the basis of this price for the raw materials. And then, using the funds coming out of Brussels which we ourselves want to make available nationally for the introductory market phase, we attempt to make an offer to

industry. The product should be used in fuels or in dyes and lacquers, for example.

SPIEGEL: Industry will not buy one liter from you if it means economic disadvantages for themselves. You will have to subsidize this product until the price is competitive.

KIECHLE: We must offer the product just as the international market would offer it. But, in other processes such as the gasification of coal for example, billions of marks are spent. Why not for agricultural products where you also have the advantage, unlike with coal, that they keep on growing?

SPIEGEL: Have you ever calculated the costs involved in the use of bioethanol, for example?

KIECHLE: Naturally. That was calculated long ago. Today, based on a beet price of about five marks per double hundredweight, we can produce alcohol for DM 1.20 per liter. The oil companies would be willing to accept bio-fuels for 60 to 70 pfennigs per liter.

SPIEGEL: And the taxpayers pay the difference. How much will you try to squeeze out of the finance minister for this?

KIECHLE: First of all I would attempt to calculate the tax on ethanol, as compared with mineral oils, based on the gross calorific value of ethanol. This would mean 20 pfennigs less mineral oil tax per liter of alcohol.

SPIEGEL: An what does the finance minister say to that?

KIECHLE: We are not that far yet, but the minister of research has signalled that from his point of view it is worthy of consideration.

SPIEGEL: When will you speak to Mr. Stoltenberg about it?

KIECHLE: We are already talking about it. The rest of the price difference, however, which would still be about 40 pfennigs, would have to be taken over by Brussels.

SPIEGEL: The economics minister accuses you of being absurd for opening up new channels for subsidized sales of surplus products. In any case, subsidies are increasing.

KIECHLE: It is a way out of the mess. Another way would be to take land out of production for a time and use it as an ecological compensation area. I think that a ten-year agreement could be concluded with these farmers on a volunteer basis.

SPIEGEL: What does that cost and who pays?

KIECHLE: Insofar as there is less pressure on the mark, Brussels pays; insofar as the social aspect is predominant, the state pays; insofar as nature preserves and the ecology benefit, the Laender pay. I think that the overall

amount needed would be approximately 800 to 1000 marks per hectare--all three components taken together.

SPIEGEL: The social aspect likely means early retirement. At what age?

KIECHLE: At 55. Those ten years would then provide the transition to the usual retirement pension at 65.

SPIEGEL: What does the farmer do during his early retirement? He keeps on farming or sells to his neighbors.

KIECHLE: He lets everything grow that wants to grow.

SPIEGEL: The early retiree makes hay?

KIECHLE: He can make hay. He can cultivate animal feed. But he must agree not to fertilize intensively.

SPIEGEL: Would that mean a restriction of property rights?

KIECHLE: No.

SPIEGEL: The Land government cannot say then that you have to dig a hole here for the turtles?

KIECHLE: If the Land government wants to dig holes for the turtles it has to buy the land. The farmer can only be obligated not to produce foodstuffs.

SPIEGEL: Barter trade will flourish in the villages. One person does not work his land, gets state subsidies for it, and makes green feed so that another person can properly expand his milking or feeding operation. Then you have both, higher production and state subsidies.

KIECHLE: No, that will not happen. First of all, the earnings after a very short time if there is no more fertilization . . .

SPIEGEL: . . . which no one is checking . . .

KIECHLE: . . . will be very low. I mean, we do not have to regulate everything with absolute perfection. Production will decrease in any case. Secondly, we will also include reforestation. It may be that there are enough people who say, I want to keep my property, but since I have no children I want to get out of production anyway. Why don't I plant a forest?

SPIEGEL: The whole thing has just one drawback. The ministers of finance and labor will not cooperate.

KIECHLE: You'll see. My good arguments will convince them.

SPIEGEL: The whole thing would be very easy to finance if Mr. Stoltenberg had not already allocated a large sum to the farmers in the form of a tax break.

KIECHLE: The program you are alluding to runs for four and a half years. One and a half have already passed. That leaves three years.

SPIEGEL: In which the farmers will be relieved of paying just under 13 billion marks in taxes.

KIECHLE: Granted. I will speak with the finance minister at the proper time about using those funds which will become available as a result of the law doing away with the present lump-sums of value-added tax and applying them to taking land out of production. We may perhaps not get the whole lot but we will use a substantial amount for that purpose.

SPIEGEL: Until then should the farmers march through Bavaria carrying signs saying "Kiechle, do something!"?

KIECHLE: I always see them with these signs. I saw them yesterday and I will continue to see them for some time because the farmers are truly in a difficult position. For three years they have suffered real price reductions, and naturally they also see that in the rest of the economy profits were increasing and so were wages and salaries. I am not surprised that they are critical.

SPIEGEL: Were you ever at the point of despair?

KIECHLE: Everyone has his emotional ups and downs. There are times when all you encounter is protest--phrases like, "The farmers are behind you--with a pitchfork; the scientists are on your side--but with harsh criticism; the commission is before you--but with opposing views . . .".

SPIEGEL: . . . and Franz Josef Strauss hangs over you.

KIECHLE: Franz Josef Strauss has helped me a great deal. That in such a situation someone, or even your own wife, asks you from time to time if your health can bear up under all of the responsibility--that does happen. But I am not tired of this job.

SPIEGEL: You want to be agricultural minister again?

KIECHLE: At no time anywhere have I ever said that I do not.

SPIEGEL: Mr. Minister, we thank you for the interview.

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ECONOMIC

NORWAY

STRONG DROP IN TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Feb 86 p 8

[Article by Odd Inge Skjaevesland: "Trade with South Africa Way Down"]

[Text] Norway's total commodity trade with South Africa dropped by 15.7 percent in 1985 as compared with 1984, from a good billion to 878 million kroner. Imports dropped by 21 percent, and exports by 13 percent. We are buying less of all goods, except manganese ore. Imports increased by 11 percent from 1984 to 1985, it appears from figures AFTENPOSTEN obtained at the Trade Ministry.

That commodity trade with South Africa last year was at a total of 878 million kroner means that it is less than one half a percentage point of Norway's total traditional commodity trade in 1985. "The government's measures have resulted in the fact that trade with the apartheid government is being reduced from month to month," Trade Minister Asbjørn Haugstvedt says in a commentary to AFTENPOSTEN. He emphasizes that the government's objective is to have all trade cut off from South Africa's present government.

Exports

First and foremost, Norway is selling precious metals from Falconbridge in Kristiansand to South Africa. In 1985 these sales constituted 80 percent of all Norwegian exports to the country. Haugstvedt points out that the ministry has received assurances that these exports will cease completely in the course of a month's time.

"This means that our trade with South Africa will be reduced an additional 50 percent as of 1 April," the trade minister points out.

Imports

Trade Minister Haugstvedt points out that Norway bought 50 percent less from South Africa last year as compared with the year before--if we disregard the manganese ore for both years. We purchased 184 million kroner worth of manganese ore in 1985 versus 162 million the year before. We imported almost 33 tons more concrete in 1985. This was an increase of 11 percent.

In addition, there has been a strong drop in imports of cupronickel matte, crude phosphate, fruits and vegetables and canned fruit.

ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

ANGOLA WANTS INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION--Angola wants broad industrial cooperation with Sweden. That desire was expressed while Under Secretary of State Carl Johan Aberg was in Angola on a mission last week. Cooperation with Sweden is desired chiefly in the transportation and construction sectors. ASEA [Swedish General Electric Corporation] recently obtained a contract, and both Scania and Volvo are in a dominant position when it comes to trucks and buses. Negotiations concerning cooperation with Sweden in the field of petroleum are underway. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 Feb 86 p 37] 11798

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